MEANING-IMPLICATION AND INFERENCE-FORMATION IN THE UNITED STATES PRESIDENTIAL PRESS CONFERENCES

Rauf Kareem Mahmood, PhD. *
Assistant Professor of English Language and Linguistics
Department of English, College of Languages, University of Sulaimani
E-mail: rauf.mahmood@univsul.edu.iq

Sumaya Khalid Mustafa
MA in English Language and Linguistics, Lecturer, Department of English,
College of Basic Education, University of Halabja
E-mail: sumaya.mustafa@uoh.edu.iq

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Abstract
The question of how people understand what others are saying, even when they do not state their intentions straightforwardly, has been debated ever since Grice put forward a theory of implicature in 1967 (Thomas, 1995). That is, speakers can implicate more or different meanings via the use of implicatures. After Grice’s work, there have been a number of other works on implicatures. On the other hand, there is some research on how people infer each other’s intentions. What has not gained attention yet is developing both implicature and inference into one unified theory; this issue is dealt with within this paper. The paper also investigates how different types of implicatures are produced and how possible inferences are formed in fourteen press conferences, held for Barack Obama the ex-president of the United States of America, as a type of political discourse in which language plays a vital role. Purposes of implicature-generation, different models and methods of inference-formation are also discussed and analyzed. The paper, which

* Corresponding Author: Rauf Kareem Mahmood, E-Mail: rauf.mahmood@univsul.edu.iq
Affiliation: University of Sulaimani - Iraq Tel. +9647701399938
Available online

is an extract of an MA thesis entitled (An Investigation of Syntax-Pragmatics Interface of Implicature and Inference Formation in the US Presidential Press Conferences), mainly concludes that implicature and inference-formation are two sides of the same coin, and forming inferences by the journalists and the audience for implicatures generated by US ex-president, Barack Obama is not necessarily deductive, inductive or abductive alone, but it apparently enjoys all.

المعنى الضمني والإستدلال في المؤتمرات الصحفية لرئيس الولايات المتحدة الأمريكية

أ.م.د. رؤوف كريم محمود
جامعة السليمانية – كلية اللغات – قسم اللغة الإنجليزية

م. سمية خالد مصطفى
جامعة حمبجة – كلية التربية الأساسية – قسم اللغة الإنجليزية

الخلاصة: إن السؤال عن كيفية فهم الأم س ل م يهم لمخ ان مر ن عاد لا يذكر ن اي ه بشكل بشر قد أقش اذ أن طرح Grice (ظرية الض اية Implicature) في ع 7691. ي كن لم دثين أن يبا ع اي مفة نلال اس دا الض ات. بعد الظرية Griceكم ن هام ب بعملأ ااب م ل م ل كيفيممة اسم ا ل الام س لا ايم ه. م لمم يمفمممممممت الاا بممممممم بمممصمصم معد هممممممم طممممممم ير كمممممممل ممممممم من الضممممممم اية الاسممممممم دلال ((Implicature and Inference) في الظريمة ا مدم مدم ال فهم الذي يتناوله هذا البحث. يحلل البحث أيضا كيفية إنتاج أنواع مختلفة من التصميمات وكيف يتم تشكيل الاستدلالات المحتملة في أربعة عشر مؤتمرا صحيحا، عقدت لباراك أوباما الرئيس الاسبق للولايات المتحدة الأمريكية، كنوع من الخطاب السياسي الذي تلعب فيه اللغة دورا حيويا، كما يحلل البحث أمراض التوليد الضمني Implicature-Generation، والنتائج المختلفة وطرق تكوين الاستدلال البحت، وهو مسئول عن رسالة Inference-Formation.

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An Investigation of Syntax-Pragmatics Interface of Implicature and Inference Formation in the US Presidential Press Conferences (the US Presidential Press Conferences)
1.1 Introduction

The notion of implicature bridges the gap between what is literally said and what is conveyed or intentionally implicated (Levinson, 1983); between natural and non-natural meaning, truth conditional and non-truth conditional meaning. Grice distinguishes between two main types of implicature: conversational and conventional (Birner, 2013). Both types convey some additional meaning, but the point of dissimilarity is context-dependency; conventional implicatures are context-free. They always imply the same content, whereas conversational implicatures are context-dependent; they vary according to the context (Thomas, 1995). However, there are other types of implicatures which are not related directly to the main types, which are explained in this paper. Implicature constitutes part of the process of communication, the speaker’s part. Communication also involves inference-formation on the part of the hearer.

Horn and Ward (2004 p.6) state that “speakers implicate, hearers infer”, therefore, one can argue that any implicature is an inference on the part of the hearer. As Yule (1996 p.36) puts it, “it is the speakers who communicate meaning via implicatures and it is listeners who recognize those communicated meanings via inference”. Grice (1975, 1989 cited in Thomas 1995) insists that communication works on the bases of the cooperative principle and the set of maxims. To put it another way, there are certain regularities in interaction governing generation of implicatures by the speaker. These regularities, i.e. set of maxims, which inform speaker’s cooperative behaviour, are also used as general guiding principles in inference-formation. Furthermore, the five ways in which the speaker can behave with respect to the CP (observing, violating, flouting, opting out, and infringing) have the potential to license on inference (Birner, 2013). That is why it is better to postulate a theory that might be more comprehensive to combine both implicature and inference.

Another support to such a view comes when both Melchenko (2003) and Abdul-Wahid (2010) who classify inferences into conventional and non-conventional (conversational); their classification is based on the types of implicatures. Moreover, successful communication is achieved when the hearer infers exactly what the speaker intends; “if the implicature by the speaker and the inference by the hearer were the same, it will result what might be called “perfect coincidence” (Mahmood, 2008 p.84).

1.2 Types of Implicature
1.2.1 Conversational Implicature

According to Mey (2001, p.46), conversational implicature “concerns the way we understand an utterance in conversation in accordance with what we expect to hear”. Consider the following extract:

(1) **Barack Obama:** If the argument is that they can't do—that they can't increase tax rates on folks making $700,000 or $800,000 a year, that's not a persuasive argument to me, and it's certainly not a persuasive argument to the American people.


Here, the context is that Obama is going to save the middle class from high taxes, but he wants to increase the tax on the wealthiest people; his competitors disagree with him, and they criticize this plan. Obama implicitly refuses their argument. He means that the folks are with him; therefore, he is going to continue working on the plan. Although it is not of benefit for the wealthy people, it is for the sake of all the American people. He has not explicitly mentioned that he is going to continue but he has implied that. To give another example:

(2) **Barack Obama:** Are you suggesting that the status quo was working? Because it wasn’t, and everybody knows it. It wasn’t working in the individual market, and it certainly wasn’t working for the 41 million people who didn't have health insurance. And so what we did was we chose a path that was the least disruptive, to try to finally make sure that health care is treated in this country like it is in every other advanced country.


The extract above carries a conversational implicature; the context is the health care plan through which Obama wants to improve the health situation all over the country. His opponents take it as a pressure against his policy. Although, Barack Obama, in that speech, does not explicitly say that Affordable Care Act has made some changes, and it is much better than the time before the implementation of the law, but he implied this intention. Hence, the following inferences could be formed:

1. The status quo (the status before health care law) was just in the interest of a group of people; it was not working for all the people equally.
2. Obama’s health care plan provides equal service for all the people.
3. He says “we chose a path that was the least disruptive”, with which he may mean that although there are obstacles hindering the activation of the plan, there is not a more appropriate alternative.
4. In the US, the health situation is not up to the level compared to other advanced countries, even though the US has the strongest economic power in the world.

Consider another example of conversational implicatures:
(3) Barack Obama: I think they recognize that unlike some other players in the region, we don’t have territorial ambitions in their country. We’re not looking to control their assets or their energy.

(June 20, 2014) [http://www.washingtonpost.com] [Accessed on June 20, 2014]

In that press conference (henceforth PC), Barack Obama talks about the situation in Iraq and their role in assisting Iraqis to build a stable and inclusive government. The implicature is that there are other countries in the region that have territorial ambitions in Iraq; they are looking to control Iraq’s energy.

Moreover, Grice (Grundy, 2000) distinguishes between two types of conversational implicatures: generalized and particularized conversational implicatures, acronymed to GCI and PCI respectively. It is also to be noted that whenever the term ‘implicature’ is used alone, in this paper, it indicates a conversational implicature.

1.2.1.1 Generalized Conversational Implicature

Generalized Conversational Implicatures (GCIs) arise without considering any particular context or scenario (Levinson, 1983). GCIs are those conversational implicatures which are inferable without reference to a special context, i.e. no shared knowledge about the context is required to form the inference and figure out the additional meaning (Levinson, 2000). GCIs lead to the same inference, regardless of whatever the context is. Consider how much is implied in (4):

(4) Barack Obama: What we also saw was that some bolts needed to be tightened up on some of the programs, so we initiated some additional oversight, reforms, compliance officers, audits, and so forth.


In the above extract, using some is a GCI. Even without resorting to the context one can infer the implied meaning: Some means not all; the implicature can be inferred as a reality that some (not all) parts of some (not all) programs need to be reconsidered. Therefore, some (not too many) reforms have started.

According to Cruse (2006), generalized conversational implicatures can be further divided into I-implicatures which correspond to quality-implicatures, quantity-implicatures, and M-implicatures which are related to Manner-implicatures.

1.2.1.1.1 Quality-Implicature

Quality-implicatures are related to the maxim of quality which arise due to non-observing the maxim of quality. They arise when the speaker says something different from what the hearer expects, or the speaker might say something for which s/he does not have evidence. According to Thomas (1995 p. 67), quality implicatures arise when the speaker says something which is “patently false”. Since the speaker does not seem to deceive the hearers, they need to look for another “plausible
interpretation”. For instance, in (5) a journalist asks Obama why certain members of the State Department have been blocked from giving their testimony in the legislation:

(5) Q by Ed Henry: And on the Benghazi question, I know pieces of the story have been litigated, and you’ve been asked about it. But there are people in your own State Department saying they’ve been blocked from coming forward, that they survived the terror attack and they want to tell their story. Will you help them come forward and just say it once and for all?


The journalist’s words show that he is sure that Obama knows the case, he says “I know pieces of the story have been litigated, and you’ve been asked about it”; if a case is litigated, then it is sent to a law court to make an official decision about it. Consequently, Obama knows about it. The journalist seems to be sure, he says that “there are people in your own State Department saying they’ve been blocked from coming forward” without saying anything that brings doubt or hesitation such as I have heard, people say. Nevertheless, through denying his knowledge of anybody being blocked Obama implies that the case is settled.

(6) Barack Obama: Ed, I’m not familiar with this notion that anybody’s been blocked from testifying. So what I’ll do is I will find out what exactly you’re referring to.


1.2.1.1.2 Quantity-Implicature

Quantity-implicature arises by flouting the maxim of quantity. This flout happens when a speaker “blatantly gives more or less information than a situation requires” (Thomas, 1995 p. 69). According to this maxim, one is to be just as informative as required, but when one does otherwise a quantity-implicature arises. The next example illustrates this:

(7) Q by Chuck Todd: Do you think without the cooperation of a handful of governors, particularly large states like Florida and Texas, that you can fully implement it?

Barack Obama: I think it’s harder; there’s no doubt about it.


Here, Obama provides less information than is required. Therefore, it is an example of quantity-implicatures. A piece of information that is missed from the answer, which can possibly be inferred, that forms the quantity-implicature is although he thinks it is harder, they can still do it. For the same reason, the journalist repeats his question, to make Obama shift the quantity-implicature into an explicit statement:

(8) Q by Chuck Todd: But can you do it without those?
Barack Obama: We — we will implement it. There will be — we have a backup federal exchange. If states aren’t cooperating, we set up a federal exchange, so that people can access that federal exchange.


This time, Obama provides the required the information. Therefore, there is no longer a quantity-implicature in that speech.

1.2.1.2 Scalar implicatures

Scalar implicatures depend on a scale of values of some sort (Cruse, 2006). According to Levinson (1983), these implicatures arise from sets of contrasting linguistic alternates of the same grammatical category that can be placed in linear order by degree of informativeness, or semantic strength. If a speaker selects a stronger item in the set, the weaker items will be asserted, but not vice versa. However, in using the weaker expression, the stronger item on the scale is negated. That is, whenever one expression from such scales is chosen all the expressions in the lower position are asserted, and at the same time the existence of all expressions higher in the scale is denied or negated (Blackwell, 2003).

Therefore, scalar implicatures are associated with the utterance of a given item on a scale, i.e. use of a scalar value or item by a speaker can generate a scalar implicature when the scalar value is replaced with a stronger item from the scale, resulting in an alternative sentence. Moreover, such scales are often called Horn scales (Birner, 2013). Horn scales are as follows:

a. Quantifiers <all, most, many, some, few>
b. Adverbs of frequency <always, often, sometimes>
c. Connectives <and, or>
d. Cardinals <n, ... 5, 4, 3, z, r>
e. Modals <must, may, might>
f. Adjectives <hot, warm, cool, cold >
g. Verbs <believe, know>; <like, love>
h. Negatives <not all, few, none>

When producing an utterance, speakers choose an expression from the scale, as in (9):

(9) Barack Obama: What I've said is, is that in order to arrive at a compromise, I am prepared to do some very tough things, some things that some Democrats don't want to see, and probably, there are a few Republicans who don't want to see either.


As can be seen in the example (9), Obama selected some in his speech which comes from the scale of quantifiers: <all, most, many, some, few>. Therefore, the use of some negates all other forms higher than some, i.e. all, most, and many. In other words, when Obama states “I am prepared to do some very tough things” he means neither all, nor most of, nor many of the things he is going to do are tough. “some Democrats” means not all Democrats, “a few Republicans” is even less than some Republicans, by which he means the number of the Republicans (the rival Party) who
do not agree with him in that specific plan is lesser than the number of the Democrats (his own Party) who disagree with him. The whole of the sentence, particularly these two expressions: “some Democrats” and “a few Republicans”, can be seen as an implicature with which Obama wants to attract opinions of the opposite party and get the support of the public.

1.2.1.3 Particularized Conversational Implicature

In contrast to (GCIs), particularized conversational implicatures (PCIs) are unique to a particular context (Birner, 2013). They arise in a certain context and inferring them requires a shared knowledge between the speaker and the hearer. An implicature from an utterance is particularized if the implicature is “only by virtue of specific contextual assumptions that would not invariably or even normally obtain” (Levinson, 2000 p.16). The same utterance might be used to implicate different intentions, and as a result they would give rise to different inferences (Birner, 2013).

What is important about PCIs is that they are context-bound. As the following extract illustrates:

(10) Q (by Major Garrett): I'd like to ask you ... about the choice you eventually will make, the next Federal Reserve chairman. There is a perception among Democrats that Larry Summers has the inside track, and perhaps you've made some assurances to him about that. Janet Yellen is the vice chair of the Federal Reserve. There are many women in the Senate who are Democrats who believe that breaking the glass ceiling, that would be historic and important. Are you annoyed by this sort of roiling debate?

Barack Obama: It is definitely one of the most important economic decisions that I'll make in the remainder of my presidency. The Federal Reserve chairman is not just one of the most important economic policymakers in America. It's -- he or she is one of the most important policymakers in the world. .... I have a range of outstanding candidates. You've mentioned two of them, Mr. Summers and Mr. Yellen -- Ms. Yellen. And they're both terrific people. I think the -- the perception that Mr. Summers might have an inside track simply had to do with a bunch of attacks that I was hearing on Mr. Summers preemptively, which is sort of a standard Washington exercise that I don't like, because when somebody's worked hard for me and worked hard on behalf of the American people, and I know the quality of those people, and I see him getting slapped around in the press for no reason before they've even been nominated for anything, then I want to make sure that somebody's standing up for them. I felt the same way when people were attacking Susan Rice before she was nominated for anything. So, you know, I tend to defend folks who I think have done a good job and don't deserve attacks.


The journalist asks Obama, who is the one that he is going to choose for Federal Reserve chairman. The journalist mentions two names "Larry Summers" and "Janet Yellen", but in his response, Obama implicitly conveys that he is supporting Mr. Summers, by defending him from the attacks on him. The underlined lines clearly illustrate this. Although, he gives some excuses for supporting Mr. Summers in his
speech, what is inferred is that Obama has made his mind and he is going to choose him over the others. The journalist’s inference clearly proves it:

(11) Q: Can you see how the perception of you defending Larry Summers as vigorously as you just did (OFF-MIKE) lead some to believe you’ve already made up your mind?


This implicature is counted as a PCI because it is bound to the context of Obama’s decision of choosing among candidates for Federal Reserve chairman, and it can only be inferred as such in that specific context. Otherwise, if Obama supported the same person in other contexts (take, for example, an imaginary situation when this man is condemned as guilty), the inference would surely be that Obama wants to show that Summers is not guilty.

1.2.2 Conventional Implicatures

Levinson (1983, p.127) defines conventional implicatures as “non-truth-conditional inferences that are not derived from superordinate pragmatic principles like the maxims, but are simply attached by convention to particular lexical items or expressions”. Unlike conversational implicatures, conventional implicatures are “context-independent” (Birner, 2013 p.66).

To form inferences from conventional implicatures, hearers need neither context nor cooperative principles; instead they are attached to particular linguistic expressions, which are a matter of convention (Birner, 2013). Levinson (1983) mentions four conjunctions that carry conventional implicatures namely: but, even, therefore, and yet, Thomas (1995) adds for, and again. Moreover, Bach (1999, p.333) lists a number of linguistic items that he calls the list of “alleged conventional implicature devices”:

1. Adverbs: already, also, barely, either, only, scarcely, still, too, yet
2. Connectives: but, and, nevertheless, so, therefore, yet
3. Implicative verbs: bother, condescend, continue, deign, fail, manage, stop
4. Subordinating conjunctions: although, despite (the fact that), even though. (ibid).

Look at Table (1) for the conventional implicature that arise from some linguistic expressions:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Linguistic Expression</th>
<th>Conventional Implicature</th>
<th>Examples from US presidential press Conferences</th>
<th>Possible Inferences</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| but                   | Contrast “contrary to expectations” | Barack Obama: That conversation has to continue, **but** this time, the words need to lead to action. (December 19, 2012) [http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu](http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu)[Accessed on June 5, 2014] | 1. There was a conversation before.  
2. This time, in contrast to what is expected, will be different.  
3. In the previous times it was all just words. |
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>conjunction</th>
<th>example</th>
<th>explanation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>and</td>
<td>In addition to, and then Barack Obama: It’s a law [Violence Against Women Act] that’s going to save lives and help more Americans live free from fear. (March 1, 2013) [Accessed on May 6, 2014]</td>
<td>1. This law saves lives in addition to keeping them from fear. 2. Some Americans live in fear. 3. The same law works for two purposes.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>even</td>
<td>contrary to expectation Barack Obama: And I think there are other areas where we can make progress even with the sequester unresolved. (March 1, 2013) [Accessed on May 6, 2014]</td>
<td>1. It is contrary to expectation for the sequester to continue, so the sequester is expected to be solved. 2. Although it is contrary to expectation, still there is some possibility for the sequester to continue, that is why Obama says there are other areas to progress.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>yet</td>
<td>the situation is expected to be different at a later time, the thing is surprising Barack Obama: Even if the website isn’t working as smoothly as it should be for everybody yet, the plan comparison tool that lets you browse cost for new plans near you is working just fine. (November 14, 2013) [Accessed on May 1, 2014]</td>
<td>1. The website is not working yet. 2. In a later time, the website will be working in a good way.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>therefore</td>
<td>a consequence of, follows from Barack Obama: Teachers at these Army bases are typically civilians. They are therefore subject to furlough, which means that they may not be able to teach one day a week. (March 1, 2013) [Accessed on May 6, 2014]</td>
<td>1. The teachers having a day furlough is a consequence of (follows from) their being civilians. 2. Civilians in the US have one day furlough per a week.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>manage</td>
<td>the action in question requires effort or involves difficulty Barack Obama: They [Russia] can advance their economy and make sure that some of our joint concerns around counterterrorism are managed effectively, then I think we can work together. (August 9, 2013) [Accessed on March 15, 2014]</td>
<td>1. Obama warns Russia, that the advance of their economy is based on their joint concerns. More obviously, he wants to say it is in America’s hand to let or not Russia’s economy to grow. 2. Russia needs to make efforts to save their joint concerns with US, as that makes US agree to work together.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>only</td>
<td>It is only the case, nothing more than the people, things, amount or activity that follows only Barack Obama: The only way to bring stability and peace to Syria is going to be for Assad to step down and — and to move forward on a political transition. (April 30, 2013) [Accessed on May 1, 2014]</td>
<td>1. According to Obama’s policy, there is only one way to bring stability to Syria. 2. Nothing other than Asad’s step down will bring stability to Syria.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table (1) Examples of Conventional Implicature and Their Possible Inferences

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1.2.3 Tautology Implicatures

According to Yule (1996 p.135), tautology is “an apparently meaningless expression in which one word is defined as itself”. Birner (2013, p.16.) states that “tautology is a sentence that is true in all possible worlds”.

From a logical perspective, tautologies have no meaning and no communicative value; still they are used in conversation. As speakers are expected to be cooperative, therefore, there must be some reasons behind their usage. There must be something more than just what the words mean; an additional implied meaning. Griceans’ explanation for such expressions is that they trigger a kind of conversational implicature called tautology implicatures (cited in Davis, 1998). Tautology implicatures arise from violations of the maxim of quantity. By using tautologies, speakers give less information than is required; as a result of this obvious violation of quantity at the level of what is said conversational implicatures are generated (Davis, 1998).

To sum up, one can say that tautology is repetition of words, phrases or ideas that apparently seem to be unnecessary, but since their use by a speaker means that the speaker intends to communicate more than what he says, they give rise to a sort of implicature called tautology implicature. For example:

(12) Barack Obama: Rape is rape. And the idea that we should be parsing and qualifying and slicing what types of rape we’re talking about doesn’t make sense to the American people.

Obama could mean that every type of rape is as bad as others. It does not matter which type of rape it is, because they are all bad. Another example is:

(13) Q (by Julianna Goldman): So you technically are willing to negotiate?
   Barack Obama: No, Julianna, look, this is pretty straightforward. Either Congress pays its bills or it doesn’t.

Here, the topic is about the debt ceiling, and the negotiations between the president, Congress and the Republicans. The use of the tautology implicature, by Obama, means it does not need to be negotiated.

1.2.4 Metaphorical Implicatures

A standard definition of metaphor is “a figure of speech in which a word or phrase denoting one kind of object or idea is used in place of another in order to suggest similarity between them” (Searle, 1979 p.413). In the framework of Grice’s theory, metaphor is treated as a type of conversational implicature (Levinson, 1983 p.34) Searle also suggests that the implicatures involved in metaphor are best understood as “indeterminate implicatures” by which it is meant that these types do not satisfy determinacy requirement, i.e. they are generated by non-observing the cooperative principle.
For Searle (1979), with metaphors speakers mean something different from what the sentence literally means. Although Searle classifies metaphors as a type of speech acts, his clarification is not contrary to the definition of implicatures: Strictly speaking, whenever we talk about the metaphorical meaning of a word, expression, or sentence, we are talking about what a speaker might utter it to mean, in a way that departs from what the word, expression, or sentence actually means. We are, therefore, talking about possible speaker’s intentions (Searle, 1979 p.77).

The important feature of such arguments to note is that by using metaphors a speaker says something but actually means something else. For this reason, they are typical examples of more being communicated than said. As can be seen in:

(14) **Q (by Julianna Goldman)**: Europe has been kicking the can down the road for years, so why are you any more convinced that we won’t see another 3-month fix emerge out of Brussels at the end of the month?

**Barack Obama**: Resolving the issues in Europe is difficult. As I said, there are a lot of players involved. There are a lot of complexities to the problems, because we’re talking about the problems of a bunch of different countries at this point. Changing market psychology is very difficult. But the tools are available. The sense of urgency among the leaders is clear. And so what we have to do is combine that sense of urgency with the tools that are available and bridge them in a timely fashion that can provide markets confidence. And I think that can be done. (June 19, 2012) from: http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu [Accessed on June 22, 2014]

“Kicking the can down the road” is a metaphor. It means to delay a decision in the hope that the problem or issue will go away or somebody else will make the decision later (Hill, 2012). At that context, the journalist means that the European countries are delaying to improve the economic status and to create new jobs. Obama, who is responsible to answer that question, as well as the audience need to work out and infer the implied meaning behind the metaphor. The journalist wants to know why Obama is waiting for Europe; in response, Obama implies that he will wait for Europe since he thinks the European leaders have the sense of urgency, so they will work together. He also speaks metaphorically when he says they have to “combine that sense of urgency with the tools”. It is just metaphor according to which combining “sense” with “tools” make sense. Obama tries to create a positive image of the situation; he means the European leaders, as well as himself, have to work together and keep in mind the need for quick thought and action to finish out what he terms ‘complex problems’.

From the above uses of metaphors, one can obtain that they are clear examples of communicating more than what is actually said. Consequently, one can claim that metaphors do not just give rise to implicatures, but they are implicatures by themselves.

Table (2) below gives a number of examples in which metaphorical implicatures are used by both Barack Obama and the journalists during the PCs. When using such metaphors, they imply some meaning, and they presuppose hearers have enough prior knowledge to form the right inference. It is necessary to say that
the examples are not the whole implicatures used in the PCs, as they are a few among many. The metaphors are underlined; their metaphorical meanings as well as possible inferences of their implied meanings are presented:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Metaphorical Implicatures in the Press Conferences</th>
<th>The Meaning of the Metaphors</th>
<th>Possible inferences of their implied meanings in the Press Conferences</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| 1   | Barack Obama: We don’t want that *genie out of the bottle*.  
     (April 30, 2013)  
     [Accessed on May 1, 2014] | to allow something bad or unwanted to happen which cannot then be stopped  
     (Cambridge Advanced Learner’s Dictionary, 2008) | The context is using chemical weapons by Assad regime and US action against that, Obama means:  
- Actions against Syria may lead to dangerous outcomes as Syria has the potential to kill a larger number of people, so they need to make the right decision based on facts. |
| 2   | Q (by Jake Tapper): I’m wondering if you could comment on the recent spate of *green-on-blue incidents* in Afghanistan.  
     (August 20, 2012)  
     [Accessed on May 8, 2014] | Attacks made by Afghan forces on US military, although they are regarded as neutral, allies and friends.  
     (Foreman, 2012) | The journalist asks Obama to talk about the attacks made by some Afghans.  
- It can be inferred from the question that:  
  - If Afghans are regarded as friends so what about such attacks? |
| 3   | Barack Obama: We put a *grandfather clause* into the law but it was insufficient.  
     (November 14, 2013)  
     [Accessed on May 1, 2014] | Exempts employees or other persons from being subject to new rules that are taking place.  
     (Political Metaphors, 2013) | Context: Obamacare:  
- They have tried to excuse some from the new law about taxes and health insurance conditions, but it did not work well. |
| 4   | Barack Obama: the more the average American who already has health insurance sees that it’s actually not affecting them in an adverse way, then it becomes less of a *political football* — which is where I want it to be. This shouldn’t be a political football.  
     (April 17, 2014)  
     [Accessed on 4/29/2014] | a problem that politicians from different parties argue about and try to use in order to get an advantage for themselves  
- Affordable health care is a plan that is for everyone, and this plan should not be used for a special group’s interests. |
5. **Barack Obama:** I can’t afford a white wash.
   (May 21, 2012)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Covering up the truth about something.</th>
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<td>(Political Metaphors, 2013)</td>
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**Context:** challenges in Afghanistan. Barack Obama implies that:
-he has told the responsible officers that he wants to know the truth and reality of the situation in Afghanistan, he does not want them to hide the truth in order to make him accept and approve it.

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table (2) Some Metaphorical Implicatures used in US Press conferences and their metaphorical and possible inferences</th>
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### 1.2.5 Presuppositional Implicatures

Presupposition is “an assumption implicitly made by speakers and listeners which is necessary for the correct interpretation of an utterance” (Finch, 2003 p.237). Speakers most often use presuppositions as a way of communication, in which they do not state explicitly what they intend their hearers to know. Givon (1979 p.50 cited in Brown and Yule, 1983 p. 29) defines presupposition in terms of “assumptions the speaker makes about what the hearer is likely to accept without challenge”. That is, when a speaker wants to make hearers agree and approve something; s/he may imply that content within his/her utterance. Example (15) illustrates the idea:

(15) **Q (by Chuck Todd):** Why do you keep — just curious, why does Senator Baucus, somebody who extensively helped write your bill, believe that this is going to be a train wreck? And why do you believe he’s wrong?

**Barack Obama:** I think that any time you’re implementing something big, there is going to be people who are nervous and anxious about is it going to get done until it’s actually done…… And for the 85 to 90 percent of Americans who already have health insurance….. So all the implementation issues that are coming up are implementation issues related to that small group of people, 10 to 15 percent of Americans…. But I think the main message I want to give to the American people here is despite all the hue and cry and, you know, sky-is- falling predictions about this stuff…. even if we do everything perfectly, there’ll still be, you know, glitches and bumps, and there’ll be stories that can be written that says, oh, look, this thing’s, you know, not working the way it’s supposed to, and this happened and that happened. And that’s pretty much true of every government program that’s ever been set up…. **But if we stay with it** and we understand what our long-term objective is…


All the underlined sentences in the question part, of the above extract, are presuppositions; they are loaded with assumptions the journalist aims to make Barack Obama accept them. The assumption is that Senator Baucus, a Democrat, has described the implementation of Obamacare as a “train wreck”. Baucus stated this phrase “train wreck” on April 17, 2013 when he was talking about Obamacare “I just
see a huge train wreck coming down” (Weigel, 2013). By this, he means that with insufficient awareness, the implementation is going to face failure (ibid). The journalist wants Obama to admit and somehow to confess that there are problems in the implementation of the program and it may face failure as his friends from Democratic Party have already admitted. Although, it has not been explicitly stated but it can be inferred from the last sentence of the journalist’s question that Obama believes Baucus is wrong.

Similarly, Obama does not state explicitly what he thinks about Baucus’s opinion. But rather he implies that Baucus is from those who are nervous and anxious about the implementation but it will be done. One can infer from his words that he tries to show a positive side of the plan; he says that most of the plan has been set up and most of the people have health insurance now. The problem is only with a small group of people. Another piece of presupposed information, which Obama assumes to be true is, that there is a public anger or disapproval, “despite all the hue and cry”, and they do not do everything perfectly “even if we do everything perfectly”, but he is going to stay with it. He wants the public to believe in it and to accept it to be true.

1.3 Reasons for Using Implicature

People often do not say just what they mean; they imply their intentions within implicatures, and they often have reasons and motivations for generating implicatures. Such reasons prominently include:

1. Economy of Language:

People use implicatures to make their language more economical than otherwise; implicatures allow speakers to use a few words to convey what they mean. At such times, the hearers need to make use of context for the inference-formation process (Grundy, 2000). This is illustrated in:

(16) Q (Jake Tapper): I'm wondering if you could comment on the recent spate of green-on-blue incidents in Afghanistan, what is being done about it.


The journalist uses a metaphorical implicature; he surely does not mean the attacks are either green or blue. The statement is used instead of a long statement about some specific attacks in Afghanistan. By green-on-blue attacks, he means that the attacks are made by forces regarded as neutral, allies and friends.

2. Tentativeness:

Implicatures can be used as a strategy for hiding speaker’s uncertainties. Using implicatures allow speakers to get rid of giving absolute opinions or statements about a situation. If you say something tentatively, you say it in an uncertain way. For example in (17), Obama talks about the situation in Iraq. He implies that Iranian leaders seem to be cooperative after they have been warned not to step and not to encourage sectarian splits that cause civil war inside Iraq:

(17) Barack Obama: Well, you know, I think that just as Iraq’s leaders have to make decisions, I think Iran has heard from us, we’ve indicated to them that it
is important for them to avoid steps that might encourage the kind of sectarian splits that might lead to civil war.


3. Solidarity:

Sometimes, implicatures are used to reinforce solidarity. When both the speaker and the hearer, but not a third participant, can have access to the meaning of an implicature because of the shared knowledge, it shows the solidarity and agreement between the speaker and the hearer against the other people (Grundy, 2000). It is worth mentioning that such implicatures could not be found in the data of this paper.

4. Avoiding Explicitness:

Implicatures are also used as a strategy to avoid explicitness. Speakers often use implicatures when they do not want to express their intentions straightforwardly due to various reasons, such as personal, political etc. (Tsuda, 1993 p.73). An example for this could be:

(18) Q (by John Karl): It's been a tough year. You may not want to call it the worst year of your presidency, but it's clearly been a tough year.... what do you think has been your biggest mistake?

Barack Obama: Well, there's no doubt that -- that when it -- when it came to the health care rollout, even though I was meeting every other week or every three weeks with folks and emphasizing how important it was that consumers had a good experience, an easy experience in getting the information they need and knowing what the choices and options were for them to be able to get high-quality, affordable health care, the fact is it didn't happen in the first month, the first six weeks, in a way that was at all acceptable. And since I'm in charge, obviously, we screwed it up.


In the example above, although the journalist asks a fairly explicit question, one cannot see such an explicit answer in return. So here, being implicit is due to avoiding explicitness.

5. Avoiding Confrontation:

Sometimes, when speakers know if they speak explicitly and clearly there will be an unwanted or undesirable argument, they try to imply their intentions. Use of implicatures is one way through which people try to make their statement accepted. In this way, hearers may accept the speakers’ opinions without challenge. An example is:

(19) Q (by Jeff Mason): Did President Putin of Russia indicate any desire on Russia's part for Asad to step down or to leave power? And did you make any tangible progress in your meetings with him or with Chinese President Hu in finding a way to stop the bloodshed there?

Barack Obama: anybody who's seen scenes of what's happening in Syria I think recognizes that the violence is completely out of hand.... Now, that doesn't mean that that process of political transition is easy. And there's no doubt that Russia, which historically has had a relationship with Syria, as well as China, which is generally wary of commenting on what it considers to be
the internal affairs of other countries, are and have been more resistant to applying the kind of pressure that's necessary to achieve that political transition.


From Obama’s response, one can infer that he does not see any hope in his negotiations with Russia and China about taking actions against Assad regime in Syria. But, he does not say this explicitly, rather he generates an implicature. The good point is that Obama can deny what he means. The implied meaning can be cancelled, and the implicature might save him from confrontation.

6. Attracting Attention:
When speakers want to make their speech more interesting or when they want to catch the hearers’ interest about what they say, they might use implicatures, as inference-formation of an implicature requires more efforts than an explicit statement, only if the participants do not share the same cognitive environment. That is, more efforts are required on the part of the hearer; therefore, the speech seems to be tricky and more interesting in a way it keeps the hearer’s attention. The following example illustrates this:

(20) Barack Obama: What would violate my commitment to voters is if I ended up agreeing to a plan that put more of the burden on middle class families and less of a burden on the wealthy in an effort to reduce our deficit. That's not something I'm going to do.


Here, the issue is about the tax rates for which Speaker Boehner proposed what he calls plan B. At the same time, Obama has his own proposal. In the extract above, he tries to catch the interest of the public towards his proposal and gives reasons for rejecting Speaker Boehner’s plan, as for the sake of the people. What can be inferred is that Speaker Boehner’s plan puts more burden on middle class, rather than the wealthy people. That is why, he does not agree with that plan.

7. Decreasing Force:

To decrease the force of a message communicated, especially in commands and requests, speakers often use implicatures which make it easier for the hearer to refuse. Cruse (2006 p.363) points out that “implicatures are inherently weaker than explicatures, so the impositive force is weaker, and a refusal by the hearer would be less impolite”. An example of this is (21), in which the underlined sentence is an implicature; Obama means that whenever Republicans negotiate with him, it hurts their benefits, and they have seen the results in the elections. So, it is better for them to agree and vote for the budget.

(21) Barack Obama: I recognize that there's some House members -- Republican House members where I got clobbered in the last election. And you know, they don't get politically rewarded a lot for being seen as negotiating with me. And that makes it harder for divided government to come together.

8. Politeness:

Politeness is a genuine desire to be friendly and pleasant to others. It includes all the forms of polite behaviour; polite language usage is one of them. It has been studied in relation to the concept of “face”, by Goffman; face means “good reputation” or “good name” (Watts, 2003 p.39). It is the self public image. For a speaker to be polite is to maintain face (ibid).

As a strategy of being polite in conversation, particularly when conveying an idea which explicitly works as a face threatening act, people employ both conversational and conventional implicatures in order to keep face. Cruse (2006 p.363) suggests that “a great part of politeness comes across in the form of implicatures”; Papi (2009 p.155) terms such implicatures as “politeness implicatures”. When talking about the four maxims of conversation, Grice (1975 cited in Chapman, 2011 p.132) says there are other sorts of maxims observed by participants in talk exchange such as “be polite” and these may generate nonconventional implicatures.

1.4 Inferencing vs. Decoding

The process of communication involves transferring meaning from the speaker through expressing (implying) intentions to the hearer and understanding and comprehending that meaning by the hearer. The speaker’s part is to convey meaning; this meaning is conveyed either explicitly (when the intention is equal with the literal meaning) or implicitly (when s/he means more than what s/he states). The hearer’s part of the process is to recognize the intended meaning. To explain this process two different models have been postulated: code model and inferential model.

1.4.1 The Code Model

The code model of communication is “based on a theory of encoding, transmission through a channel, and decoding”. This model assumes that the speaker and the hearer share not only a common language but a common context (Byrne, 1992 p.22). The code model claims that “a communicator encodes his intended message into a signal, which is decoded by the audience using an identical copy of the code” (Wilson and Sperber, 2004 p.249). This model only works when the hearer decodes what has been said by the speaker, such as in (22) where the journalist seems to have decoded Obama’s speech:

(22) **Barack Obama**: Above all, Iraqi leaders must rise above their differences and come together around a political plan for Iraq’s future. Shia, Sunni, Kurds, all Iraqis must have confidence that they can advance their interests and aspirations through the political process rather than through violence.

**Q (by Colleen McCain Nelson)**: you said that it’s a time to rise above differences, that there’s a need for more inclusive government.

(June 20, 2014) from: [http://www.washingtonpost.com](http://www.washingtonpost.com) [Accessed on June 20, 2014]

Unsurprisingly, this does not happen all the time. This model would seem to allow only for the recovery of the semantic meaning of a sentence (Byrne, 1992), it has no
role for intention and pragmatic meaning at all because pragmatic meaning always involves contextual knowledge. Therefore, this model is widely rejected outside of linguistics and also often within linguistics (Mann, 2003).

1.4.2 The Inferential Model

The inferential model, developed by Grice (1989 cited in Wilson and Sperber, 2004), claims that communicators provide evidence of their intention to convey a certain meaning, which is inferred by the hearers on the basis of the evidence provided. Inferential model works according to the cooperative principle, and best works to explain how hearers understand implicatures as code model works best to explain how explicatures work (ibid). This model argues that the process of interpreting a message by the hearer is far more complex than just decoding (Regotti and Greco, 2006). A clear evidence to support this idea is the inference of conversational implicatures by the hearers; they cannot be inferred only by decoding what the speaker has said, such as in:

(23) Q (by Mark Landers): What specifically do you plan to do in a second term to tackle the issue of climate change?

Barack Obama: I am a firm believer that climate change is real, that it is impacted by human behavior and carbon emissions. And as a consequence, I think we've got an obligation to future generations to do something about it.

(November 14, 2012) [Accessed on May 1, 2014]

If you just decode Obama’s response in the above extract, it simply means that he knows climate change is real, and it is affected by humans. Therefore, there should be some action to stop or lessen it. However, just decoding, here, is not enough as what the words mean is not the answer of the journalist’s question; there is another implied meaning behind his words. The hearers need a more complex process than just decoding. That response shows that broad action on climate probably is not very high up on the priority list at the moment, and there is not an immediate plan to tackle it.

However, what can be claimed is that communication involves linguistic coding and decoding, but linguistic meaning is just a part of evidence that would help a hearer to infer what the speaker means. Therefore, linguistic codes are neither irrelevant nor enough for the process of inference-formation on the part of the hearer. In other words, within this complex form of communication, decoding processes are considered a piece of evidence from which the hearer can infer the speaker’s intentions. As a result, “the semiotic component becomes subservient to the inferential process” (Regotti and Greco 2006 p.86). In order to show how communication and the process of inference-formation involve both linguistic and contextual knowledge, it is better to be tackled according to a theory, proposed by Sperber and Wilson, called ‘Relevance Theory’.
1.4.3 A Relevance Based Model

Neither of the two other models or approaches can explain how hearers can simultaneously infer both implicatures and explicatures. For such reasons and to show that communication does not always work according to the cooperative principle, Sperber and Wilson proposed Relevance Theory (henceforth RT) (Regotti and Greco 2006 p.86) also known as post-Gricean theory. It is primarily about how people get implications from an utterance by inferring it in a cognitive context (He Ziran, 2006 in Bai and Chen, 2010). As Bai and Chen (2010) argue inference is the core of RT. One of the central claims of RT is that “there is a wide gap between the (coded) sentence meaning and the (inferred) speaker’s meaning, which has to be filled inferentially (Yus, 2006 p.854). From a RT perspective, pragmatic inference is “just as important in determining what is explicitly communicated as in determining what is implicitly communicated” (Chapman, 2011 p.104). According to RT, hearers try to achieve the “optimal relevance”; to infer is to search for relevance (Bai and Chen, 2010 p. 47). For example:

(24) Q (by Stephen Kalitz): Did the capture of Mr. Libi comply with international law?

Barack Obama: We know that Mr. al-Libi planned and helped to execute a plot that killed hundreds of people, a whole lot of Americans. And we have strong evidence of that. And he will be brought to justice.


Literally, Obama’s answer is irrelevant with the journalist’s question, because the expected answer is “yes” or “no”. It is obvious that Obama does not answer the journalist’s question explicitly. According to the RT, to grasp the implied meaning, some relevance must be established. Therefore, from what Obama has said, the following inferences can be formed:

1. It is true that they have captured Mr. Libi.
2. They have captured Mr. Libi because he is suspected, and it is not without enough evidence.
3. To capture any one that plans or helps to execute a plot complies with international law.
4. The capture of Mr. Libi complies with international law.

One can suggest that the processes of decoding and inference-formation are complementary rather than contrary as decoding is a step of the process of inference-formation, i.e. inference-formation depends on contextual evidence including linguistic context. In other words, decoding of the linguistic expressions is a part of the process of inference formation, as they work as well as other evidence such as situational context and shared knowledge for the hearer in recognizing the speaker’s intention. This can be presented in example (25):

(25) Q (by Julie): How much responsibility do you feel like you bear for these cuts taking effect?
Barack Obama: what doesn't make sense -- and the only thing that we've seen from Republicans so far in terms of proposals -- is to replace this set of arbitrary cuts with even worse arbitrary cuts. That's not going to help the economy. That's not going to help growth...

But what is true right now is that the Republicans have made a choice that maintaining an ironclad rule that we will not accept an extra dime’s worth of revenue makes it very difficult for us to get any larger comprehensive deal. And that's a choice they're making. They're saying that it's more important to preserve these tax loopholes than it is to prevent these arbitrary cuts.

Q (by Julie): It sounds like you're saying that this is a Republican problem and not one that you bear any responsibility for.


In the above text, the journalist asks about budget cuts that start to take effect on the same day of that PC, and Obama’s responsibility concerning the cuts. Obama implies that it is Republicans’ suggestion and proposal. He states that they even want more cuts, and he does not like it in this way since he knows that this proposal cannot solve the problem. It will not help the economy growth. He thinks it is not right, as it will not help the middle-class. However, that is a choice of Republicans, he still hopes they will be successful for the sake of their country, and he says we need to work altogether to get recovered from the issue. From that speech, the journalist infers the implied meaning of Obama’s speech. She says “it sounds like you're saying that this is a Republican problem and not one that you bear any responsibility for”. The journalist’s inference is based on both the contextual evidence as well as Obama’s words. She decodes the speech as the words meanings are also part of the process of inference-formation. Thus, decoding is not something far from inference-formation; it is a part of it.

1.5 Methods of Inference-Formation

As mentioned earlier, each of the types of implicature constitutes a type of inference. Conventional implicatures lead the hearers to infer utterance meanings as a matter of convention for that reason, they can be called conventional inferences. Scalar implicatures can be called scalar inferences, and so forth.

Despite that, there are other typologies of methods of inference-formation. Although, Josephson and Philip (1994 cited in Levinson, 2000 p.42) argue that “our understanding of the range of alternative inference methods is still too limited to permit a proper typology”. Nevertheless, they classify inference methods into three types: deduction, induction, and abduction (ibid; Papi, 2009).

1.5.1 Deductive Inferences

Deductive inferences are formed when a person goes beyond available evidence to form a conclusion which always follows the stated premises, and if the premises are true, then what is inferred is true (Johnson and Philip, 1993). According to Levinson (2000), deduction gives rise to conclusions by instantiation in a general law. Moreover, for Douven (2011) what is inferred is could be considered true if the premises from which it is inferred are also true; that is, the truth of the premises is
essential factor behind the truth or the falsehood of the conclusion. This means that in deductive inferences the hearer has some general rules or principles on the basis of which s/he interprets the speaker’s utterance and digs out for the intended meaning; hearers calculate utterances in accordance to some premises.

1.5.2 Inductive Interferences

Induction enables one to reach general conclusions from multiple observations of singular facts (Levinson, 2000); such inferences are made when a person goes beyond available evidence to form a conclusion. Inductive inferences are those inferences that are based purely on statistical data, such as observed frequencies of occurrences of a particular feature (Douven, 2011). In such cases, one cannot be sure that the conclusion is a logical result of the premises, but it is possible to assign a likelihood to each conclusion (Johnson and Philip, 1993).

1.5.3 Abductive Inferences

Douven (2011) states that abduction is a type of inference that “assigns special status to explanatory considerations”. This type of inference is frequently employed, both in everyday and in scientific reasoning (Douven, 2011). Harman (1965, cited in Atlas 2005 p.13) describes abduction as the “inference to the best explanation”, or “inference to the best interpretation”.

Abductive inference’s role is in determining what a speaker means by an utterance; specifically in decoding utterances as a matter of inferring the best explanation of why someone said what s/he said in the context in which the utterance is produced. For Douven (2011), Grice’s maxims help hearers to work out the best explanation of a speaker’s utterance; therefore, by observing the maxims of the cooperative principle, hearers only need the abductive method of inferencing. This means, according to the cooperative principle, the hearer only applies abduction. S/he believes that the speaker gives enough information in a clear and relevant way. However, most often this is not the case, as speakers generate all the kinds of implicatures. Therefore, by abduction alone hearers cannot always get the intended meaning.

In summary, in abductive inference the hearer only relies on the speaker’s utterance and infers the direct meaning of the speaker’s words; for s/he believes that what is said is equal to what is intended; here what the hearer does is just decoding. It is interpreting an utterance literally without basing on proof.

(26) Barack Obama: I think people want to know that everybody has been playing by the same rules, including people who are seeking the highest office in the land.

Q (by Chuck Todd): You said that one of the reasons you wanted to see Mitt Romney's tax returns was you want to see if everybody is playing by the same set of rules…. which is this implication, do you think there's something Mitt Romney is not telling us in his tax returns that indicates he's not playing by the same set of rules?
One can notice that, in the example (26) the inference that the journalist forms for Obama’s speech is not formed only out of direct meaning of the utterances. He has based it on some other premises such as context and shared knowledge.

Conclusions

1. Pragmatics alone cannot answer efficiently how hearers form inferences of the intended implicatures generated by the speakers.
2. Concerning the language used by Barack Obama, it is concluded that Barack Obama uses linguistic devices (specifically syntactic and pragmatic) in a diplomatic way; he expresses his intentions in a way that serves his purpose. One point that characterizes the press conferences is heavy use of implicatures by Obama; the implicatures are generated through different pragmatic and syntactic strategies.
3. Implicature and inference-formation are two sides of the same coin, and forming inferences by the journalists and the audience for implicatures generated by Barack Obama is not necessarily deductive, inductive or abductive alone, but it apparently enjoys all.
4. Conversational implicatures are context dependent, and one aspect of context is linguistic context or co-text, syntax is one perspective of linguistic context, so it is also involved in implicature generation and inference-formation.

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