A Survey of Code of Surprise’s illocutions in English syntax

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Abstract

Emotionally triggered utterances consist of sentences and phrases which express delight, annoyance and surprise which gather under the general title of expressive speech acts or exclamatives, and deserve a comprehensive study in terms of their semantics, pragmatics, and even audio and acoustic features. The purpose of this paper is to explain and describe the illocutionary features of these types of affective sentences and phrases based on Searle’s theory. The research method is based on the use of library resources and descriptive method. In addition, in this article, the role of intentional power in determining the form and meaning of exclamative sentences and expressions, the distribution of these sentences from the point of view of speech acts and subsequently, the semantic constraints imposed on these sentences and phrases are examined. Finally, it is concluded that exclamative sentences and phrases, or in short, exclamatives, represent a unique category of verbal acts.

Keywords: Exclamatives, Illocution Force, Searle, Speech Act Theory.

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1. Introduction

Among major types of speech act categories, there is a consensus among linguists over three types of declarative, interrogative and imperative propositions, each with its own particular morpho-syntactic features (Sadock & Zwikey, 1985). In the course of ordinary daily interactions, interlocutors are normally counted as addresses that play the role of hearers or actors toward declarations or interrogations, but in the case of exclamatives, interlocutors are not provided with any reason-providing incentives. Utterances are made not only for conveying information, but also are used for reflecting the kind of impression that information have on the language users. Code of surprise in reflective utterances according to Aikhenvald (2004: 195) reflects these kinds of utterances as new brand information which are presented to the unprepared mind of the speaker. Expressives in this view reflect the mental condition of the speaker; hence, they express rather than inform the audience of something.

By examining the pragmatics, semantics, syntax and typology of exclamatives, there have been researches done such as Searle (1979), Michaelis (2001), Zanuttini and Portner (2003), Beijer (2003), Inhayer (2005), and Rett (2008 a, 2008 b) in this field. Inhayer (2005) tries to get a better understanding of exclamatives by distinguishing them from expressive or emotive utterances. In order to get this goal, he builds up his assumption on how exclamatives and other emotional utterances may be analyzed in terms of sentence types and speech act types. Therefore, Inhayer (ibid), following Beijer (2003) categorizes surprise utterances into three types of exclamative, emotive and

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1 There are different titles for highlighting Exclamatives used by other scholars such as: expressive utterances, exclamatory utterances, expressive sentences, exclamations, exclamatives, and expressive speech acts, which the title of this paper and by following Michaelis (2001), has been selected as “Code of Surprise”.
expressive. In this category, exclamative and emotive types are directly emotive, while expressive utterances are not, and moreover, emotives do not constitute a speech act of their own; they are assertions that lend some features from the expressives.

On the other hand, Rett (2008 a, 2008 b) and Zanuttini and Portner (2003) are among the researchers who have followed this field and have mainly focused on the cognitive aspects of exclamative category of sentences. The syntactic properties of these sentences and phrases are similar to the syntactic properties of paragraphs with interrogative words and phrases, so it has received less attention in such studies. Zanuttini and Portner (2003) do not consider exclamative sentences and phrases to be related to the speaker's astonishment, and the reason for this is such things as the following case; They argue with respect to the surprising clauses of the questionnaire that:

“One way to look at this issue is how high it's! It seems that his height was unexpected. This is not true at all, and other examples such as what a delicious dinner you made! And what a beautiful house you bought! They are also of this kind. In this example, the narrator did not mean that he did not expect to have a delicious dinner or see a beautiful house.” (Zanuttini and Portner, 2003: 54).

There is no doubt that the above cases were not beyond the expectation of the speaker, but due to the eloquence of the eccentric expressions, these expressions can be used dishonestly and thus in fact indicate theological literature that violates the Sincerity rule to meet a number of social requirements.

2. Method and Hypotheses

As a pioneer in this field, Searle (1979) refer to exclamations as instances of an utterance type that he calls them expressive utterances. Searle (ibid) considers speaking to be a regular practice and considers different speech acts to be in accordance with the Constitutive rules related to them. He enumerates four types of rules as Content rule, Preparatory rule, Sincerity rule and Essential rule. Constitutive rules play a key role in determining whether speech acts are acceptable or appropriate to the audience. Regarding the above rules, it seems necessary to mention the following points: In the case of the Preparatory rule, the addressee has a clear reason for the accuracy of the quoted statement; That is, if he does not believe in the correctness of the said proposition, then the sentence or phrase of astonishment expressed by him will be appropriate, or in other words, the sentence of astonishment has met the felicitous condition, for example, if we have a sentence with the semantic content that (Jack is not tall.) Now, if someone says (how tall Jack is!) This sentence has violated the Preparatory rule. Michaelis and Lambrecht (1996) as well as Michaelis (2001) discuss an influential intuition of what is behind these examples. The idea is that wh-exclamatives have a scalar semantic nature. Michaelis analyses the sentence, (You wouldn’t believe who they hired!) as being rendered with respect to a scale of people, ranked in comply with their incompetence with respect to the job. Thus, this sentence expresses that (the person hired) is relatively positioned on top of the scale. Crucially, Michaelis (ibid) assumes that such a scalar ranking of individuals corresponding to the question word who needs to be triggered by the syntactic context. It should also be noted that before saying a surprise sentence, direct evidence about the main proposition should be available to the speaker in order to be able to express his feelings with the background of his thoughts on the subject, which in this regard can be the following as a witness stated: If Jack eats an unpleasant food and his friend does not have
information about that food, then any comment from Jack's friend about that food, especially by saying surprising sentences, will be an incorrect and non-felicitous statement, and in fact he has no epistemic connection (Aikhenvald: 2004).

According to the Sincerity rule, the audience believes the main proposition about which they express surprise. According to Searle (1979: 65), when the speaker expresses his mental and psychological state, this means that a person cannot honestly ask for greetings, but can honestly promise or say a sentence. Since expressives are a subset of sentences and spoken phrases, they can therefore be expressed in a non-sincere way, and utterances containing them require that the speaker consider their content worthy of attention in the sense that it would be influenced by them or at least, their mind gets involved. Finally, according to the Essential rule, by expressing an astonishing sentence, a person expresses his opinion about that proposition, or in other words, shows the share of an astonishing sentence in the discourse. In the following, we will examine four different cases that show the effect of these rules on the appropriateness of the following surprise sentence, expressed by Mary:

1. What a surprise! Merlin phoned her mother.

In the first case, Mary always knows that Merlin forgets to call her mother. Mary hears their conversation on the phone. Here, because of all the rules, his words are true. In the second case Mary already knows the importance of the fact that Merlin should call her mother this week. Merlin promises Mary that she will call her mother in the afternoon, and Mary believes this, and because of the lack of direct evidence and the violation of the Essential rule, her words will be dishonest. In the third case Mary knows that Merlin always forgets to call her mother, and she believes that Merlin will forget to call her mother this week as well. Because the speaker does not believe in the statement, the Sincerity rule is violated and his speech is unnecessary. In the last case, Mary knows that Merlin always calls her mother at certain times of the week. Mary overhears the conversation of the two people on the phone and because this issue is not significant from her point of view, so by violating the Sincerity rule, her speech is unnecessary.

Michaelis and Lambrecht (1996: 375) believe that any particular speech act is related to the construction of a certain utterance, but they see the question of whether it is possible to attribute an astonishing function to sentences and phrases. In categorizing the types of sentences, little attention has been paid to the constructions of exclamatives, which indicates the small volume of studies and research in this field. In the vast majority of these researches, only two or more sentences and only a part of these sentences are examined. Accordingly, exclamative sentences are a subset of simple sentences that use in their construction (what) and assume the roles of adverbs and adjectives:

2. What he do! What he say!

In the above example, (what) plays the role of pronoun. In this regard and in addition to (what), the word (wonder) is also considered as a feature of exclamative sentences and considers them as an adjective of wonder. The term "surprise dependencies" to refer to words such as "what, wonder, how much" and the like that come with exclamative sentences and phrases, and considers their function to be different pragmatically. Language is referred to as a discourse sign. For example, considers "what" and "wonder" to be among the previous dependents of the noun, which are used together with the noun.
3. Discussions

The utterance of a sentence is in fact a kind of verbal action, and since the utterance of a sentence or an exclamative phrase itself is considered as a state of surprise by the speaker, so it is considered a kind of executive verbal action which Austin (1962: 54) believes there is a difference between executive and expressive speech in performing an action and expressing it. Following Austin also there is a distinction between Expressive and Descriptive sentences. In this research, exclamative phrases are divided into four categories based on the following examples:

3. a) (Wow) John bakes delicious cakes!
   b) (Well done) what a delicious cake John baked!
   c) (Boy) Doesn't John bake delicious cakes!
   d) (Well done) the cakes that John bakes!

Sentence (a), which has an ordinary sentence construction, becomes an exclamative sentence only by changing the tone of the words. is followed in this article by Rett (2008a), the surprise sentence and the next three sentences, which have interrogative clauses, inverted clauses and We call certain groups of nouns that are eccentric expressions, and we draw the following diagram for them, which are divided into two distinct groups due to the obvious semantic differences between sentences and eccentric expressions:

Diagram 1. Exclamatives classification according to Rett (2008a)

Since exclamative sentences appear as predicative sentences, it must be assumed that in the absence of negative elements, the semantic content of the exclamative sentence appears as a proposition.

3.1. Illocutionary force of the exclamative sentences

If the content of the exclamative sentences is in the form of a proposition, then the requirement for applying the illocutionary force of the exclamative sentences is that the speaker finds the proposition worthy of attention, but if this content is a function instead of the proposition, it will not correspond to the illocutionary force. Searle (1979) shows illocutionary function with $F (p)$, according to which $F$ represents the illocutionary force and $p$ the content of a fragmentary proposition, but exclamative expressions do not show a proposition, and even Bierwisch (1980) expands this dilemma over introgative sentences. Since exclamative sentences are expressed by declarative sentences containing propositions, the illocutionary force factor must have the ability to limit the data when necessary, which in fact is the task of illocutionary force. Exclamative sentences are concrete examples of other speech acts that can be imagined for declarative sentences; In other words, they prove that we are dealing with
different types of data. Han (2000, 2002), for example, considers rhetorical questions to be expressive sentences made with the help of interrogatives; instead of saying, "Nobody likes eggplant curd." We say, "Who likes eggplant curd?!"). There are two limitations to the semantic elements present in exclamative sentences: the first to the degree (including type, method, and person) and the second to the textual standard.

The important point is that the textual standard guarantees the degree, for example in the sentence (I will eat a piece of cake) there is no evidence that the verb will occur in the distant future; Thus, textual standards are unique degree indicators in which reference to textual value standards is limited to graded structures. Therefore, if in the case of the force operator it is necessary to mean an exclamative sentence that is one of the subjects of a statement beyond the standard, then the degree constraint is automatically violated. The result of this discussion is that the following characteristics are considered for the illocutionary force: The intended power (\( \gamma \)) expressed by the speaker (s) in context (c) would be appropriate if:

a) S has a direct reason and evidence for proposition \( p \);
b) S believe the proposition \( p \); and
c) S considers the proposition \( p \) to be significant, in which case \( p \) is equal to \( \gamma \).

It is assumed that all exclamative expressions represent the properties of degree, and this is consistent with the semantics of interrogative clauses when they appear in the clauses (cf. Jacobson: 1995; Zanuttini& Portner: 2003; and Rett: 2008 b) or, according to some experts (Groenendijk & Stokhof: 1989) when they are accompanied by interrogative sentences. These hypotheses are assumed to have descriptive interrogative expressions that are involved depending on a number of constraints, such as whether they are alive or inanimate (Caponigro: 2004). The limitation of the illocutionary force can indicate the fact that exclamative expressions are formed only with interrogative clauses that contain the interrogative words:

4. a) How short (very short) your son is!
   b) How much (very much) you have written!
   c) How stingy your neighbors are!
   d)* Where is he getting a guest!
   e)* Why did he leave the university!

The reason for the unacceptability of the above two exclamative sentences (d and e) is the inability of their question words to question the degree of the phrase and the relevant paragraph.

3.2. Speech act of the exclamative phrases

So far we have said that exclamatives include a kind of category of sentences are considered a kind of verbal act and therefore in the opinion of most speech act utterances, exclamative sentences are considered as the main event and because in speech act there is no embeding, so the exclamative sentences could not be embeded (Krifka: 2001), makes an exception to this). On the other hand and from a syntactic point of view, Elliott (1974) and Grimshaw (1979, 1977) says that the clauses embeded by the exclamative verbs are called embede clauses and their behavior determine the behavior of the exclamative sentences. In fact, Grimshaw’s Studies find such statements as vague:

5. John knows how high the ceiling is.

He is skeptical of the two interrogative and exclamative readings in the example above. According to the interrogative reading, John knows the exact height of the ceiling, and
considers that the height mentioned in the example above is relatively high. Now, according to an exclamative reading, he knows and is aware that the roof is high, regardless of whether he knows the exact height of the roof or not. By adding an intensifier, the ambiguity between the interrogative reading and exclamative reading can be removed and only the exclamative reading can be allowed:

6. John knows how high the ceiling is.

Based on these observations, Grimshaw considers the presence of the intensifier in the following verses as a sign of their exclamative reading and divides the verbs that can be embedded into three categories; Verbs that can or cannot or need to have exclamative clauses. The three verbs ask, know, and being surprised are examples of these three, respectively:

7. a) *Jack asked how cold the air is outside.
   b) Jack knows how cold the outside air is.
   c) Jack is surprised at how cold the outside air is.

Of course, the distribution of intensifiers in interrogative clauses is independent of the status of their exclamative modes, and their ambiguity is a separate issue; it is said that, unlike exclamative clauses, intensifiers are not used in conjunction with interrogative clauses:

8. a) How much Michel has a shirt!
   b) How big is your garden!
   c)* How many children does Michel have?
   d)* How big is your garden?

On the inadmissibility of intensifiers in interrogative clauses, Abels (2004) believes that most questions containing a presupposition indicate the speaker's negligence of the answer, and this presupposition would be in contradiction with the meaning conveyed by the intensifiers. Removing intensifiers results in the acceptability of these sentences:

9. If the first floor is so hot, how hot should the upper floor be?

The reason for acceptability of the above sentence is that the resonance constraints contain certain preconceptions that are different from the preconceptions of Exclamatives and are much less associated with the interrogative clauses than the exclamative clauses. Grimshaw (ibid) is skeptical about the exclamative reading of interrogative sentences such as sentence (6) and suggests an approximate reading for it. In particular, the two readings of the same example differ in the presence or absence of the estimation element, regardless of whether the degree used exceeds the textual index; their interrogative reading includes the degree to which the ceiling is so high, but the exclamative reading includes a degree beyond the standard and standard of ceiling height. The following example is the negative equivalent of the sentence (how much) and is not negative in reading:

10. John knows how short the roof is.

This sentence is only exclamative when John knows that the ceiling is short. This is related to the relationship between positive and negative opposites and its effect on estimation and should not be attributed to the semantics of embedded verbs. Sentences with negative contrasts will have an interrogative reading if they contain intensifiers:

11. The landlord scratched his head and John asked him how short the roof was.

Attributing the evaluativity feature to surprising sentences and phrases is not a good idea because it goes well with other graded constructs. To better understand the subject, look at the following two examples:

12. a) John is as tall as Mary.
   b) John is shorter than Mary.
The first example is consistent with the reading that John is tall or relatively tall, but the second example is acceptable in situations where John is short, and in short it can be said that from Abel’s (2004) point of view, the presence of an intensifier in an interrogative clause depends on the context, because these are intensifiers that have strong presuppositions. One of the results of the discussions so far is to divide exclamative sentences and phrases in the subset of speech acts. Following Austin (1962), Searle observed that the illocutionary force of many speech acts is similar to that of some verbs with embedded complements, which he referred to as Illocutionary Force Indicating Devices (IFIDs):

13. a) On the way back home, I also go to the store.
   b) I promise to go to the store on the way back home.
   c) Bring my bag with yourself.
   d) I order you to bring my bag with yourself.

The obvious question that comes to mind at this point is whether the power of meaning and actions are the same as the embedded complement (I wonder ...)? Of course, they are not one and the characteristics of Exclamatives cannot be understood according to the characteristics of the embedded clauses. Also, another aspect of their difference is in relation to the operators of illocutionary force, for example, in a context in which the speaker is surprised, both the illocutionary force and the embedded clause (I am surprised that ..) have the ability to show astonishment. But the way each one is expressed is different; while verbs with the ability of embedding can be true or false, the content of the illocutionary force cannot be confirmed or denied:

14. a) I wonder how I won the race.
   b) Yes, you look surprised.

15. a) (Wow) I won the match!
   b) ≠ Yes, you look surprised.

Although sentence 14 (a) is less commonly used in everyday speech, the audience cannot confirm or deny the speaker's mood. Sentence (15) is even more unusual in the sense that confirmation in sentence (15b) indicates that the speaker must have won the contest; On the other hand, the verb (surprise) and the verb or verbs that are embedded in its complement clause do not pass the Searle executive speech test:

16. a) *Surprised that John likes pizza.
   b) *I hereby declare that John loves pizza.

If the exclamative phrases are a subset of Exclamatives and their expression is declarative or executive, this fact is a reason to distinguish the meaning of Exclamatives from verbs with embedded complements, but the main difference between these two types of constructions is that in terms of forms which are allowed for each one:

17. a) * I wonder if Mary can make food.
   b) * I wonder if Mary likes roast chicken.
   c) I'm surprised by the clothes she wears.

4. Conclusion

In this article, we have tried to provide a uniform definition of exclamative sentences and phrases based on their behavior in the form of discourse, but there are reasons to distinguish between them, one of which is that exclamative phrases can be estimated, which is contrary to the exclamative sentences. Then, the characteristics of illocutionary force of the exclamative sentences were examined, according to which these sentence should contain a statement that is significant from the speaker's point of view or the input of this statement is beyond the textual standards; since the domain and degree are the only domain with textural standards. Illocutionary force also includes
the limit of degree, which is one of the lexical-syntactic consequences of this feature; i.e. only structures are used as exclamative sentences that are gradable.

On the other hand, exclamative sentences will express speech acts in several ways, so that they do not have the means to indicate the illocutionary force, and their illocutionary force imposes certain restrictions on the semantics and syntax of these expressions. Exclamative sentences and phrases alone cannot describe speech acts: the semantic and cognitive study of Exclamatives will affect their syntactic and morphological understanding.

Reference

