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Gricean Approach to Study Implicatures is Revisited

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Abstract

Implicature is one of the important pragmatic concepts. What is said is different from what is implicated or intended by the speaker. The current study is concerned with the main theories that have introduced and viewed implicatures. It also attempts to shed light on the main differences and similarities between these theories. It is divided into five sections: (1) it is an introduction to the topic, (2) It deals with Grice's view of meaning, implicature and its maxims, and implicatures in literary texts (3) It tackles the Neo-Gricean theories such Horn's Theory (1984) and Levinson's theory (1987), (4) It is concerned with the Post-Gricean theories mainly Relevance Theory (1995). The study ends up with some conclusions that are the outcome of this study.

Keywords: Implicatures, Maxims, Relevance, Context, Literary Texts.

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إعادة النظر في النهج الغريسي لدراسة الآثار

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المستخلص

الاقحام اللغوي هو أحد المفاهيم الهامة في علم التداولية والذي يعني بأن ما يقال يختلف عما يعنيه أو يقصده المتكلم أو الكاتب. تهتم هذه الدراسة بمراجعة النظريات الرئيسية التي تناولت هذا الظاهرة اللغوية كما تحاول تسليط الضوء على أوجه الاختلاف والتشابه بين هذه النظريات. وتتضمن الدراسة خمسة مباحث وهي (1) مقدمة للموضوع، (2) توضيح وجهة نظر Grice في المعنى والاقحام اللغوي وأحكامها وثوابتها وتداعياتها في النصوص الأدبية، (3) عرض نظرية Horn (1984) ونظرية Levinson (1987)، (4) مراجعه نظريات الحادثة ما بعد ثابنت غرايس (maxims) وخاصة نظرية الموائمة (Sperber and Wilson 1986). وتنتهي الدراسة ببعض الاستنتاجات التي هي حصيلة هذه الدراسة.

الكلمات الدالة: الاقحامات اللغوية، الثوابت، الموائمة، السياق، النصوص الادبية.

1. Introduction

One of the fundamental claims in pragmatics is made by H.P. Grice a philosopher of language. As far as meaning representations are important, Grice believes that meanings are implied or suggested rather than said. Such type of meaning goes beyond of what is said and is considered as speaker-intended implicatures. The implicated/implied meaning by a speaker or an utterance can be different from what is said. Saying something and implying something else is one of the topics that are related to theories of meaning representation in pragmatics (Keenan and Keenal, 1976, pp. 67-8; and Culpeper and Haugh, 2014, p. 84).

The concept of implicature was first introduced by Grice in (1967) in a series of lectures on *Logic and Conversation*. Then, this concept was also published in (1975). The aim of introducing implicatures is a philosophical need to explain the different ways of speaker's communication not only by following the linguistic form of an utterance, but also by knowing the intention of the speaker. Grice (1975, p. 24) introduces terms as 'implicate' the verb and 'implicature' the noun. This coinage is to distinguish between what is said and what is implicated in any communicative event. To support his thesis, he states that linguistic factors, human behaviour and cognition

are related to the meaning conveyed in any conversation (Chapman and Clark, 2019, pp.2-3).

Grice's main contribution to philosophy of language are represented by a theory of meaning and a logic of conversation. They have an influential role in both linguistics and pragmatics in particular. His theory has played an important role to clarify how conversational implicature emerge and how they are recognized and understood. Grice distinguishes between the different types of meaning that are related to utterances and their significance. He draws a distinction between what is said and what is implicated, and between implicatures and generalized and particularized implicatures.

2. Grice on Meaning: Natural Meaning and Non-Natural Meaning

Natural and non-natural meaning is another distinction made by Grice (1957) which is also related to his theory of communication and implicature. Simply, meaning_N is concerned with a particular sign that is related to an event or concept, for example:

1. Those clouds mean rain.
2. Smoke means fire.

As for the non-natural meaning (meaning_{mn}), it arises from intentions that a speaker has.

Grice (1957, p. 25) divides the non-natural meaning or speaker meaning into two main types: what is said and what is implicated. According to what he proposed, what is said is "closely related to the meanings of the sentence elements, their order and their syntactical feature". What is said can be explained by considering Charlie brown's example:

1. Charlie Brown: Shovel your walk?

In this example, one needs to specify the syntactic structure of this utterance. For instance, *shovel* is a verb that indicates a certain type of action, *your walk* is a noun phrase, the object of the action, *your* is a pronoun that refers to Lucy, and the sense of *walk* in this utterance refers to the path not the action of walking.

In a word, the distinction between natural meaning and non-natural meaning is the distinction between using language in an arbitrary and conventional way and using language in a means of communication where language is encoded in the speaker's mind and decoded by the hearer. This leads to a successful communication between them. The current study aims to show what the characters tries to convey by using the two types of meaning.

2.1 Gricean Principle

An intelligible conversation can be carried out when each participant assumes that the other is attempting to take part in a proper way. Grice (1975) considers conversation as a cooperative activity. His claim is true even the participants are being in a quarrel or a debate, they are still trying to continue the conversation. In accordance to Grice, there are default assumptions that are related to conversation. These assumptions are general represented by the Cooperative Principle and specific sub-principles labeled 'Maxims' (Huang, 2014, p. 29; and Chapman, 2020, p. 33). The cooperative principle is explained by Grice as follows:

*Make your conversational contribution such
as required, at the stage at which it occurs,
by the accepted purpose or direction of the
talk exchange in which you are engaged*

(Grice, 1975, p. 45)

As far as dramatic texts are concerned, irony is one of the literary devices that are considered in the current study. It is studied in terms of pragmatics and Grice's cooperative principle. His claims that a violation of the maxim of quality by saying

something that patently false, so the hearer assumes that the speaker is intending and implicating the opposite. For instance,

1. Got to take the scenic route today... Theatre lift's broken, isn't it? (Lodge, 1995/1996, p. 9).

This is the way to say the opposite of what is meant. In this example, the aim is to describe a way of reaching objectives indirectly (Black, 2006, p. 111).

In a word, the cooperative principle is formulated to know how people understand each other in case of non-natural meaning. By considering the cooperative principle, communication is viewed as a cooperative behaviour. In this process, participants are cooperating together to produce what is communicated to achieve certain goals. Sometimes, the participants might be uncooperative as in case of lies in order to deceive each other. The cooperative principle should be taken into consideration between the characters in order to understand the implicit meaning and what they intend in their exchanges.

2.2 Gricean Theory of Implicature

The notion of Implicature has been a central topic in pragmatics. It is defined as a specific type of meaning that results from the process of implication which speakers and listeners rely on in the production and interpretation of utterances. Grice (1975) proposes that both speakers and hearers have a presumption that utterances in a conversation are made according to a variety of norms that determine the appropriateness and reasonability of conversation. To understand the meaning of an utterance, one needs to look at its words, their combinations and content linguistically. For example,

1. Robin managed to sell her pounds before the bottom went out of sterling market. (Mey, 1994, p. 157).

This example is not only about the selling of pounds freely, but also about some effort to sell them in a market in a time people are trying to get rid of the floating currency. In such example, the implicature is conventional.

The other type of implicatures is the conversational one. It arises through contexts. Grice (1975, p. 47) assumes that the conversational implicatures are used for particular purposes during the talk exchanges. The participants recognize those purposes in the exchanges. As far as the participants have the same purpose in common, their exchanges are carried out cooperatively to achieve the common purpose (Gu, 1993, p. 173). Conversational implicatures emerge from the act of saying not from what is said. They are not part of what is said and its truth condition. In this respect, an implicature can be true or false, but their truth-conditions do not depend on the truth-conditions of what is said (Bianchi, 2013, p. 112).

To conclude, the main point in the study of implicatures is that they are pragmatically constructed. Implicatures are non-truth conditional aspects of what a speaker means. It is a part of what is meant not a part of what is said when he/she utters something on an occasion. The difference is what a speaker says is what the sentence means, whereas what he/she implicates is a different meaning. Implicatures are divided into two types: conventional and conversational.

2.2.1 Grecian's Maxims

People use language as any other human behaviour, they participate in communication to achieve certain goals. They expect others to maintain certain categories. This results in recognizing the mutual goals and cooperation between the participants. This can be expressed by four different categories of behaviour. Those categories can be explained in one or two maxims. As for as what is said and what is implicated are connected, it should be mentioned that this connection is not arbitrary,

but it is rule-governed. He presented these assumptions in terms of cooperative principle and sub-principles, i.e., maxims (Chapman, 2005, p. 90 and Kroeger, 2018, pp. 141-2).

1. Maxim of Quality (Maxim of Truthfulness).

- a. Do not say what you believe to be false.
- b. Do not say that for which you lack adequate evidence.

This maxim can be summarized as *say what is true*. In fact, a person cannot always be sure of what is true. The only way is to believe that it is true. According to this maxim, people must say what they believe to be true. If they believe that something is not true or false, they must not say it. As for the inferences based on this maxim, they are hardly noticed, because they are inferred from what a speaker says is true (Chapman, 2000, p. 131; and Daly, 2013, p. 187). For example, a lecturer begins his class by saying:

1. Today, I'm going to talk about Markedness Theory.

The inference made by students is true, since what is inferred is reliable information being encoded in the utterance and the lecturer is going to talk about this theory. Another important point is whether the maxim of quality is flouted or violated. Violation can be related to lies. It is also possible to flout this maxim. Flouting the maxim of quality is represented by making an utterance contrary to the belief that what the utterance literally means cannot be the intended meaning.

2. The Maxim of Quantity (Maxim of Informativeness).

- a. Make your contribution as informative as is required.
- b. Do not make your contribution more informative than is required.

The maxim of quantity is subdivided into two submaxims. The first one can be summarized as being as informative as is required for the current propose of the change (Green,1996, p. 93). The following example shows how the answer is not informative enough to answer A'S questions.

1. A: Where will the test take place?
B: Somewhere in this building.

B's answer shows that he does not know exactly the place the speaker is asking about. His answer is an implicature linked to the assumption that B is cooperative, because he/she is trying to give information as much as they can. The maxim of quantity relates the speaker to what is necessary, but not more than what is required.

3. Maxim of Relation (Maxim of Relevance).

Be relevant.

This maxim is related to the expectation that the speakers are relevant. It deals with the relationship between particular utterance and what proceeds or follows it. In addition, this maxim is concerned with the current utterance and its context, both textual and situational, since the utterance is related to what comes before and after it and what happens in the context of situation (Birner, 2013, p. 40) For example:

1. A: Where's my box of candies?
B: It's in the kitchen.

Or

2. A: Where's my box of candies?
B: Your sister and brother were in the kitchen this morning. (I don't know. You can ask them).

In the first exchange, it is clear that there is a relation between the speaker and the hearer. As for the second exchange, in case both the speaker and the hearer are cooperative, the speaker will be able to understand what the hearer means by implicating that the sister and the brother have been taken the box or know about that.

4. Maxim of Manner: Be Perspicuous (Maxim of Clarity).

- a. Avoid obscurity of expression.
- b. Avoid ambiguity.
- c. Be Brief.
- d. Be orderly.

This maxim describes how speakers say something. The submaxims can be summarized as follows. By avoiding obscurity of expression, it is assumed that a speaker tries to use the least obscure way to express his/her view. If this maxim is considered, the speaker will be able to produce a clear utterance. It depends on both participants' beliefs regarding what is clear to the addressee. For example, a professor of linguistics would never use linguistic terms such as implicature, markedness and so on with his family members. If he did so, he would assume that such terms are clear to them. As any other maxim, the flouting of this submaxim and being obscure on purpose aims to make someone unaware of the content of the conversation. The aim of doing so is either to keep information from someone or to make him/her out of the conversation (Clark, 2013, p. 71). Let us consider the following example to illustrate what has been said,

1. A: The team flies tomorrow morning.
B: The apples are in the refrigerator.

It is clear from this example that B's response is unclear, because he/she does not want someone else to know about the team. It could be something confidential. In such cases, what is conveyed is done by flouting the maxim of manner and it results in an implicature.

Regarding the second submaxim, it is followed without leading to any particular implicature, because the unambiguous utterance does not convey any pragmatic meaning and the hearer does not need to look for additional meanings. Nevertheless, flouting this maxim may appear for literary or humorous affects (Yi-bo, 2015, 605-6).

Be brief is the third submaxim and it is similar to the second submaxim of quantity "Do not make your contribution more informative than is required". Otherwise, the failure of being brief means that the contribution is more informative than is required. In addition, saying something irrelevant is another case of being more informative than is required (Griffiths, 2006, 138-9). This can be noticed in the following example:

1. A: How does this shirt look on me?

B's answer depends on his/her opinion. If B thinks A looks terrible, he would have to choose one of the two choices: either saying that

B (1): You look terrible.

or

flouting the brevity

B (2): I've seen it on you before. The color is bright.

In the latter answer, A would make an inference that 'You look terrible'.

Finally, the submaxim of manner is be orderly. It means that the speaker narrates events according to the order of their occurrence.

2.3 Types of Implicature

Beside the distinction made by Grice (1957) regarding the natural and non-natural meaning. Grice (1975) distinguishes between what is said and what is implicated. This distinction is made within the category of non-natural meaning. This distinction is based on truth-conditions. Types of implicatures and their subtypes will be explained in detail in what follows.

2.3.1 Conventional Implicatures

Conventional implicatures are related to the use of particular words or constructions. This type of implicatures belongs to the field of semantics due to its

relation to the conventional meaning. A conventional implicature is determined by the meaning of a word such as connectives (Thomas, 1995, p. 57). This can be illustrated through the following examples:

1. He is an Englishman; he is, *therefore*, brave.
2. He is an Englishman *and* he is brave.
3. He is brave *because* he is an Englishman.
4. He is an Englishman, *but* he is brave. (Zufferey et. al, 2019, p. 90)

The expressions used to express conventional implicatures can be discourse connectives as in the aforementioned examples *therefore, also, too, only and, but, because* and so on. There are also verbs that can be included such as factive verbs like *realize, forget* etc., and implicative verbs such as *fail* and *mange*. They trigger conventional implicatures, since they result in the derivation of implicature. In example (1), the speaker means that because he is an Englishman; therefore, he is brave. The truth of *therefore* is related to what is inferred. For this reason, the truth of what is inferred depends on what is said. So, the meaning of this connective does not affect the truth conditions of the discourse (Zufferey et. al, 2019, p. 90).

Levinson (1983, p.127) shows that this type of implicatures are non-truth conditional inferences. They are related to particular items or expressions. In other words, they do not emerge from pragmatic principles like maxims. Conventional implicatures are non-cancellable, detachable, and not calculated.

2.3.2 Conversational Implicatures

Conversational implicatures are implicit meaning that result from the exploitation of the principle of conversation and the use of some maxims of conversation. The derivation of this type of implicatures is based on an assumption of cooperation between a speaker and a hearer. This cooperation is related to a deliberate flouting of the conversational maxims. It can be said that conversational implicatures are kinds of implicit communication that needs to be inferred. The hearer in this case is responsible for the conclusion that results from the process of reasoning (Röhrig, 2010, p. 11; Zufferey et. al, 2019, p. 211; and Chapman, 2020, p. 37).

Grice (1975, p. 47) shows the relation between the conversational implicatures and the talk exchanges. He proposes that the participants recognize a common purpose through those exchanges (Gu, 1993, p. 173). Let us have the following examples:

1. A: Can you tell where the bank is?
B: I'm a tourist here myself. (It means I don't know)

It is clear from the B's replay that he *cannot*, but his statement does not convey this intended meaning. His statement would be the intended meaning for that question only (see, Kroeger, 2018, p. 140).

Conversational implicatures are related to the cooperative principle and the conversational maxims, since they play an important role in clarifying why a speaker says something and what he means or intends something else. This type of implicature is implemented in every day life conversation. In addition, one can apply this phenomenon to literary texts to analyze what is said and what is implicated by the characters.

2.4 Literary Texts and Implicatures

Gricean pragmatic theories are concerned with the interactional functions of language. They are useful to be used in analyzing conversation in literary texts. Applying a pragmatic phenomenon to a literary text is one of the objectives in the current study. The aspects that are studied in the pragmatics of literary communication are actions carried out by the production of a text, the conditions of those actions and the connection between the actions and their contexts (Van Dijk, 1981, pp. 13-16).

Culpeper (2001, p181) demonstrates the use of implicatures in drama. He attributes the emergence of implicatures in drama to both characters and audience, or by the audience and leaving the characters oblivious to what is happening. This is known as dramatic irony. It can be noticed when a playwright tries to convey a message to the audience through the characters. For example, one character says something implicitly to the other character. By flouting a maxim, an implicature is created by the character that implies something for the other character. In this case, audience can recognize this implicature. Sometimes, the character generates implicatures that can be worked out only by audience that results in dramatic irony.

Sell (2000, p. 52-8) shows that authors of written texts including the literary ones, might flout conversational maxims to give rise for implicatures. Such things aim at producing particular effects that are similar to face-to-face communication. This can be said about Monika Maron's novel (1996) *Animal Triste* where the narrator flouts the maxims of quality and quantity, and possibly the relevance by telling some personal issues for which she lacks even about her personal information such as her age and how she becomes alone (Warner, 2014, 396). The core of the study in question is to apply the pragmatic phenomenon of the conversational implicature and inference to dramatic texts. Some views claim the emergence of implicatures in such texts depends on the characters and their audience or on the audience only. The flouts of maxims in the characters' exchanges result in generating implicatures.

3. Neo-Gricean Theory of Conversational Implicature:

3.1 Horn Theory of Implicature

In the previous sections, it has been explained that Gricean maxims have been considered as rules that are followed by speakers and hearers to have a cooperative conversation. Grice's classical theory of conversational implicature has been revised by giving rise to a number of refinements and reinterpretations. The cooperative principle and its maxims are reduced as it can be noticed in the following attempts. However, the most influential theories among all the Neo-Gricean attempts are the Horn's theory (two principles) and Levinson's theory (three principles). The two theories do not consider Grice's maxims of equal importance. Horn (1984) proposes that a cooperative conversation requires two principle: the quantity principle and the relation principle (Marmaridou, 2000, 246; and Rett, 2015, p. 77). The two principles can be summarized as follows:

1. The Q-Principle (1984, p. 13).
 - a. Make your contribution sufficient;
 - b. Say as much as you can, given R.
2. The R-principle (1984, p. 13).
 - a. Make your contribution necessary;
 - b. Say no more than you must, given Q.

The Q-Principle corresponds to Grice's maxim of quantity and the first two submaxims of Manner which are *Avoid Obscurity of Expression and Avoid Ambiguity*, whereas the R-Principle corresponds to Grice's maxim of relation and one of the submaxims of manner that is *Be brief*. regarding maxim of quality, Horn believes that it cannot be reduced, because it is considered as a super-maxim that is supposed to be implemented above the level of the two principles (see, Lambrou, 2014, pp. 151-2, Huang, 2014, p. 45).

To conclude, Horn approach in the Neo-Gricean theory of implicature is concerned with the reduction of Gricean maxims to two principles: Q-principle and R-principle. The Q-principle (hearer-oriented) deals with quantity, while the R-principle

(speaker- oriented) is concerned with relation. Gricean maxims are divided between the two main assumptions that are common to both the speaker and the hearer.

3.2 Levinson's Theory of Implicature

This theory has been developed in a series of publications Atlas and Levinson (1981); Levinson (1987a), (1987b), (1995) and (2000). There are some Hornian points shared by Levinson. The R-principle introduced by Horn (1983) has been developed by Levinson (1987) to include more specific inferences. Levinson (1983) argues that the maxims of Quantity, Relation and Manner can be reduced to three pragmatic principles: I-Principle, Q-Principle and M-Principle. (see, Mattausch, 2004, pp. 66-7; and Röhrig, 2010, p. 15).

In comparison to Horn's theory of implicature (1983), Clark (2014, p.88) shows the aspects of similarities between the two theories. The I-principle functions as the Horn's R. Principle. Essentially, Levinson's approach is based on three principles and associated heuristics: Q-Principle, I-Principle and M-Principle. As for the Q-Principle and the I-principle are similar to Horn's Q and R principles. These principles will be explained in details in the following sections:

The Q- Heuristic (Quantity Principle): It includes

1. the Speaker's Maxim.

*Do not provide a statement that is informational
Weaker than your knowledge of the world allows,
unless providing an informationally stronger statement
would contravene the I-principle. Specially, select the
informationally strongest Paradigmatic alternate that
is consistent with the facts*

(Levinson,

2000, p. 76)

The information provided by a speaker should not be weaker than his/her knowledge of the world allows. Otherwise, they have stronger information will break the I-principle.

2. Recipient Corollary.

If the speaker produced the strongest statement which is consistent with what he/she knows; therefore, the speaker would know that his/her statement would be false or the speaker does not know if the intended meaning is recognized or not.

The Q-heuristic is related to Grice's first maxim of quantity and Horn's Q-principle. It leads to scalar implicatures. For example, if someone says the following:

1. I ate three slices of cake. Instead the speaker said
2. I ate two slices of cake.

The second sentence implicates that he/she did not *eat three slices of cake*.

It can be noticed that this heuristic relies on a contrast set, i.e., a set of possible utterances the speaker could have said. Choosing one of the options implicates that others are not applicable. This can be said about scales as uttering *some* implicates *not all*; and unordered sets as uttering *white* implicates *not black* (see, Birner, 2013, 56).

Q-implicatures are of three types: Q-scalar implicatures, Q-clausal implicatures and Q-alternate implicatures. The Q-scalar implicature are the same of Horn scales (Huang, 2014, pp. 51-3). For example:

3. The soup is warm.

Implicature: The soup is not hot.

As for the Q-clausal implicatures, they depend on a set of semantic alternates. This case is exemplified as follows:

4. Jack is a psychiatrist or pediatricist. (Disjunction)

Implicature: Jack is perhaps a psychiatrist, or perhaps not a pediatricist; perhaps a psychiatrist, or perhaps not a pediatricist.

5. Sam believes that Carole has travelled to Poland since April.

Implicature: Carole may have travelled Poland since April.

Finally, the Q-alternate implicatures are divided into two sub-types: Q-ordered alternate implicatures and Q-unordered alternate implicatures. The first sub-type is concerned with lexical expressions that are ranked informationally in a set as in the following example:

6. Mark tried to study medicine ten years ago.

Implicature (2): Mark did not succeed in studying medicine ten years ago.

Implicature (1): Mark succeeded in studying medicine ten years ago.

On the contrary, the second subtype includes lexical expressions in the set of equal semantic expressions (Huang, p. 53). It can be clarified by the following example:

7. The wall is white.

Implicature (1): The wall is not, for example, grey or yellow.

Implicature (2): The wall is not orange and blue, or

Implicature (3): The wall is only/all white.

The I- Heuristic (Informative Principle)

It is related to Grice's second submaxim of quantity and Horn's R-principle. Just like Horn's R-principle, it leads to an inference to the stereotypical situation. Accordingly, the inferences made are from the more general utterance to more specific and most informative default interpretation (Cook, 2014, p. 858). The I-principle is a maxim of minimization when it is for a speaker, but it is a maxim of maximization when it is for a hearer. Let us consider the following examples:

1. Martin and Dany sang a song.

Implicature: Mark and Dany sang a song together.

I (Speaker) or speaker's maxim: "Say as little as necessary". It is followed to produce the minimal linguistic information to achieve the communicative goals. The Q-Principle should be taken into consideration.

I (Hearer) or Recipient corollary: The speaker's content is amplified to specify the interpretation and get the speaker's intention (Levinson, 2000, p. 114).

The I-principle is similar to Horn's R-principle (1983, p.13) "Say no more than you must (given Q)". They differ in terms of being more precise, since I-principle indicates some aspects that require more specific interpretation. In addition, it depends on three general requisites: two maxims of relativity and a principle of noncontroversiality (Atlas and Levinson, 1981, p.40). The maxims are as follows:

1. First Maxim of Relativity.

According to this maxim, what is highly uncontroversial should not be said by a speaker. So, any proposition entailed by common ground does not need not be said.

2. Second Maxim of Relativity

The hearer must take what he/she hears as highly uncontroversial. In other words, the one that is consistent with the common ground.

3. Convention of Noncontroversiality

A stereotypical relation obtained between individuals is noncontroversial.

From what has been said, one can define the principle of informativeness as the most informative proposition is the best interpretation that can be got among the different interpretations that consistent with the common ground. It can be said that the I-principle is the outcome of a collection of cases that are aforementioned such as bridging, noun-noun compounds, possessive interpretation and so on (see, Zufferey et al., 2019, pp. 124-7; and LePore and Stone, 2015, p. 50).

The M-Heuristic (Principle of Manner)

It is related Grice's maxim of manner (avoid obscurity, avoid ambiguity and be brief). The I- and M- principles work in an opposite direction just like the Horn's Q- and R- principles. In addition, their result is similar to the division of pragmatic labour, that is, "unmarked expression license inferences to unmarked situation. On the other hand, marked expressions license inferences to marked situation" (Birner, 2013, p. 55). Horn's Q-principle has the same function of Levinson's Q- and M-heuristics. However, there is a difference between them in terms of the contrast sets of Levinson: semantic and formal. The Q-heuristic contrasts expressions that say different things are semantically distinct. Regarding the M-Heuristic, it assumes a contrast sets of expressions that say nearly the same thing, but in different terms. In other words, expressions that are distinct, but semantically similar. For instance,

1. I love most Demis Roussos

Implicature: I don't love all Demis Roussos songs.

2. George likes coffee.

George does not love coffee.

These examples handle Levinson's Q-heuristic. *Most* is semantically weaker than *all*, and *like* is semantically weaker than *love*.

- a. Speaker's Maxim

It involves avoiding a prolix, obscure or marked expression without reason.

- b. Recipient Corollary

I-Principle operates in an opposite direction, since it is concerned with inferences that result from a semantically weaker interpretation to a semantically stronger one. For instance, the conjunction buttressing, conditional perfection, mirror maxims, bridging inference, frame-based inference and membership categorization. These cases are shown in the following example:

3. Sam pressed the button and the machine worked. (Conjunction Buttressing)

Implicature: Sam pressed the button and then the machine worked.

Implicature: Sam pressed the button and thereby caused the machine worked to open.

Implicature: Sam pressed the button in order to make the machine work.

Briefly, Levinson's theory is another version of Gricean theory of implicature. However, it differs from the original theory in the way the maxims are classified. According to this theory, there are three heuristics or principles: Q-heuristic, I-heuristic and M-heuristic. Each heuristic is concerned with one aspect. So, the main issue in the neo-Gricean theories is the reduction of the Gricean maxims.

4. Post-Gricean Theories: Relevance Theory

Relevance theory has been influential over the past thirty years in both fields of semantics and pragmatics. It aims to explain communication and how people understand each other, that is it is after how people understand the meanings and referents of words and what they mean by generating them in a particular situation. This theory was introduced by Sperber and Wilson (1986/1995). It is an attempt to include a cognitive account of verbal communication. According to them, Grice's theory (1975) has proposed an inferential approach to verbal communication rather than the conventional account. The aim of his approach is philosophical in terms of discussing the notion of meaning. In addition, one of his important claims is that speaker's meaning expresses intention that is inferred by the hearer. This inference is based on the cooperative principle and the nine maxims. (Zufferey et. al, 2019, p. 45).

Sperber and Wilson (1986a) present this theory as a general view of human cognitive communication. They argue that human attention and thought are associated

with information that is relevant. In other words, communication is after getting someone's attention and implying the relevant information. This thesis is called the Principle of Relevance (Sperber and Wilson, 1987, p. 697).

Context in this theory is a very important notion, since relevance is defined in context as "an assumption is relevant in a context if and only if it has some contextual effect in that context" (Sperber and Wilson, 1986, p. 122). Sperber and Wilson (1986/1995) argue that relevance of an input is regarded as a matter of degree. The input is more relevant, if the cognitive effects are greater in number and the mental effort related to the processing is smaller (Kecskes, 2016, p. 18).

Taguchi and Yamaguchi (2019, 34) view Relevance theory as an advanced theory of Grice (1975) for different reasons, such as condensing the four maxims of Grice into one, i.e., the maxim of relevance due to the claim that they overlap. This can be seen in the following example:

(1) A: How was your driving test?

B: I don't know.

In this example, B's response flouts more than one maxim, maxims of relevance, since B does not reply directly to A's question, and he/she does not provide sufficient and useful information. According to Sperber and Wilson's theory, the relevance of utterances has a central role in communication, since people look for it automatically even if the utterance is unrelated to what information precedes.

Another important point to be clarified in relevance theory is the distinction between informative intention and communicative intention. The former is "the intention to inform the audience of something", whereas the latter is the intention to inform the audience of one's informative intention' (Sperber and Wilson, 1986, p. 29). These two intentions have a particular function by making ostensive-inferential communication possible. They are used to form a system of communication which completes the code model that is used in linguistic communication. They also refer to the reasons of using ostensive communication, beside making an informative intention known, ostensive communication can change the cognitive environment (a set of facts that are manifest to an individual) of both speakers and hearers. This change of their mutual cognitive environment results in a change in their interaction. So, the communicative intention is "the intention to make mutually manifest to audience and communicator, the communicator's informative intention" (Sperber and Wilson, 1987, p. 700).

To sum up, relevance theory is an extension of Gricean approach of implicatures. It is concerned with two principles: cognitive and communicative. In spite of the differences between the two approaches, they share some features in common such as inference.

4.1 Principles of Relevance

There are two principles of relevance that compose generalisations about cognition and communication.

1. Cognitive Principle of principle is that "Human cognition tends to be geared to the maximization of relevance" Clark (2013, p. 29).

One must understand the meaning of relevance and maximization. This theory is based on the notion of relevance that can be represented by sounds, thoughts, sights, inferences, memories to be defined according to the balance between cognitive effects and processing effort. So, two stimuli can be compared according to the effects they have. In case, the stimulus has more effects, it can be more justifiable for the effort

required to process it (see, Daly, 2013, p. 201). For instance, if someone looks out of the window and see that:

(8) There is a nightingale in the garden.

The speaker considers it significant and he/she knows more things about the world that before they looked out of the window.

Sperber and Wilson (1987, p. 700) claim that human cognition is relevance-oriented. Depending on the cognitive environment of someone, the inference of assumptions to be kept can be determined and the change of the environment that affect the thoughts can be explained. As a result, the people's thoughts can be affected by modifying their cognitive environment.

2. The communicative principle of relevance. It can be explained as

“Every utterance conveys a presumption of its own optimal relevance.” Clark (2013, p. 32)

Wilson (2017, p. 85) explains the way in which how a communication can be successful. The speakers must get the hearer's attention, because this attention is related automatically to what is relevant. In other words, the hearer should consider the utterance to be relevant. On the part of the speaker, he/she takes into account in their communication that the utterance fulfils this precondition which is what the communicative principle deals with. (Sperber and Wilson, 1986/1995, pp. 266-78). There are two conditions that determines whether an utterance is optimally relevant:

1. Optimal relevance.

a. “It is at least relevant enough to be worth the addressee's processing effort”.

b. “It is the most relevant one compatible with the speaker's abilities and preferences”.

According to the condition (a), an addressee has a presumption at the least relevant sufficient to be worth his processing effort. As for (b) condition, the hearer also has a presumption that the speaker will go beyond this minimal level of relevance. This depends on the reduction of the processing efforts required and increasing of the cognitive effects achieved. (Jodlowiec, 2010, p. 51; Clark, 2013, p.32).

2. Relevance-guided comprehension heuristic.

It is followed by the hearers/addressees to interpret an utterance or any other ostensive acts in a communication. this heuristic is motivated by the communicative principle of relevance and the presumption of optimal relevance.

a. “Follow a path of least effort in construction an interpretation of the utterance (and in particular in resolving ambiguities and referential indeterminacy, adjusting lexical meaning, supplying contextual assumptions, deriving implicatures, etc.

b. “Stop when your expectations of relevance are satisfied”.

The presumption of optimal relevance is confirmed by identifying an overall interpretation. Thus, the addressee uses both explicit and implicit levels. The explicit level is related to the decoded sentence meaning, whereas the implicit level is used to complement this meaning in order to get the required cognitive effects to meet their expectations of relevance. This heuristic is an automatic procedure to achieve this goal (Clark, 2013, p. 37; Ifanntidou, 2014, p. 108; and Wilson, 2017, p.85).

Briefly, relevance theory is based on two principles: the cognitive and communicative principles. According to the former, one can attract the hearer's attention to offer relevant information instead of following the cooperative principle. As for the latter, it is related to the optimal principle. So, an assumption or a stimulus is relevant is the most relevant one if it is ostensive.

4.2 Code Model

The code model of communication had been dominated in linguistic theories before Grice introduced the theory of conversation. It should be mentioned that the term of code model was introduced by Sperber and Wilson (1986). Code can be defined as a system of signs that have meaning. The process of communication can be successful if both speakers and receivers share the same code. However, the code model presupposed that the intended meaning of an utterance can be achieved by depending on the code of the utterance only without considering the contextual factors (Huang, 2007, p. 185). On the contrary, Sperber and Wilson (1995, p. 6) argue that context plays an important role in the code model of communication, since the comprehension of an utterance depends not only on decoding the linguistic codes, but also the real world. For example,

1. Fried eggs should be cooked properly and if there are frail or elderly people in the house, they should be hard-boiled. (Kreb, 2010, p. 8)
2. That's too heavy.

This example is advice by the government in the UK during an outbreak of salmonella. The pronoun *they* refers either to eggs or frail elderly people. As for the second utterance, the addressee has to identify what *that* refers to. In addition, the meaning of *too heavy* is semantically incomplete and the addressee has to explain it. Accordingly, the pure code model cannot be followed to interpret such utterance. There must a model that depends on inferences to interpret utterances. For this reason, Gricean theory and later approaches that depends not only on decoding, but also on hearers' inferences (Matsui, 2000, pp. 34-7; and Kreb, 2010, p. 8).

The use of a code is important in any verbal communication. All theories of communication are based on code model. This model differs from Grice's model which is called the inferential model. The inferential model depends on producing and interpreting evidence. Sperber and Wilson (1995, pp. 3-4) defines a code as "a system of which pairs messages with signals, enabling two information-processing devices (organisms or mechanism) to communicate. A message is "a representation internal to the communicating device". As for a single, "it is a modification of the external environment which can be produced by one device and recognized by the other".

In a word, code model has been used in different theories of linguistics. However, its use in relevance theory is associated with Sperber and Wilson (1995) who distinguish it from the Grice's inferential model that is based on decoding and interpreting utterances. As for the code model, it consists of a set messages to be communicated.

4.3 Relevance Theory in Literature

Relevance theory is also employed in analyzing literary works particularly metaphor interpreted by conversational inference. It has been applied on texts that contain figurative language. Warner (1992, p. 74) explains the inference of a metaphor and how a hearer must infer the differences between the literal and literary referents of metaphorical expressions depending on context. To distinguish implicatures from metaphors, one has to consider Grice's maxim of quality. For example, if two friends talk about someone by describing him as:

1. He is a dark horse.

This proverb has two interpretations: literal and metaphorical. This proverb metaphorically means that the absent person is someone who keeps his/her interests or issues secret. The literal meaning of this proverb would be false if it occurs instead of the metaphorical one, since one of them should be intended (see also, Carston, 2002, p. 350).

According to relevance theory, metaphorical utterances do not assume that the speaker commits himself/herself to the proposition to be implicated. Such utterances share properties in common with loose talk or approximations (Clark, 2013, p. 163). Let us see the difference between the following examples:

2. Anita is six feet tall.
3. Brian is fifty miles from here.

In example (2), there is no assumption that she is exactly six feet tall. As for (3), one cannot assume that he lives exactly fifty miles away. The important point is to find the relevant implications as referring to Anita as being approximately six feet tall. This can be also said about metaphorical utterances. For instance,

4. He's a wild animal.
5. You're on fire tonight.

One cannot consider or assume that he is not a human, but he/she can assume that he is a person who is hard to be controlled. As for the other example, the assumption is not you are burning or on fire, but the person is energetic and performing well and so on. This type of utterances is considered as similar as other kinds of utterances. In order to understand them, one has to be able to access the intended implicatures being communicated. Clark (2013, pp. 63-4) also deals with irony similarly. In this type of figurative language, irony being used in utterance represent implicitly thoughts or other utterances. In other words, they are echoic, since they are attributed to others. An utterance can be echoic when the speaker's attitude is expressed to views, he/she implicitly attributes to someone else (Wilson and Sperber, 2004, pp. 272-3). The following examples show the difference between utterances being ironic and non-ironic.

6. Sarah: What did Jerald say?
Diana: You're amazing.

The two utterances are non-ironic, because they are neither tacitly attributed nor tacitly dissociative. There is a possibility that Diana is expressing her own thought or she might be attributing this thought to Sarah.

One can come to the conclusion that it is possible to consider relevance theory in analyzing literary texts that include figurative language particularly the figurative phenomena, such as metaphor, irony etc. that can convey information indirectly or implicitly. This point is important to be considered in analyzing the selected data in the current study.

5. Conclusions

The current study came up with the following conclusions:

1. Implicatures are meanings that are not asserted, but implicated by the speaker and the hearer should recognize it, i.e. infer it.
2. Context of situation plays an important role in the interpretation of implicatures.
3. The concept of implicature has been viewed by different scholars. Some of them share common points, whereas others have different perspective.
4. As far as maxims are concerned in the study of implicatures, theories of implicatures are based on Gricean view of implicatures though the other theories have reduced or merged the Gricean maxims.
5. Among the theories that have been viewed, relevance theory can be implemented in analyzing a daily life communication or characters communication in literary texts, simply, because it is based on two essential principles: cognition and communication. Each works on one part, for instance, cognition is related to how the hearer's attention is attracted in order to make them infer what is intended, whereas the communicative principle is concerned with the stimulus or the assumption that can be the most relevant.

6. Our view is that of relevance theory which states: whenever the intended meaning (what is meant) violates the literal meaning (what is said) is irrelevant; therefore, it is an implicature. It is tantamount to say that deducing implicatures from texts is based on the violation of “maxim of relation”, i.e., relevancy maxim and hence our model is relevance theory.

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