



Speech Acts and Meaning: Austin vs. Searle on Intention and Direction

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Abstract

This work examines the differences in the way J.L. Austin and John Searle observe the meaning in the speech act theory, and in particular, the notions of direction and intention. On one hand, even though both philosophers consider language as an act of action, they are much different in pressing home the connection of utterances regarding performative social contexts versus the internal intentions of first sentence meaning constructs composed by the speaker. Based on qualitative and comparative analysis of both 'How to Do Things with Words' by Austin and 'Speech Acts' by Searle, the paper outlines vital places of convergence, and divergence of the two authors in approaching the meaning of words and its usage in particular circumstances and intentionality. It proves that to Searle, intentionality takes center stage in the classification of speech acts whereas to Austin, meaning is placed in the context of performative and situations. In support of the argument, the paper points out that speech acts may not be given their meaning in terms of linguistic form, but rather a meaning in terms of context-sensitive and goal-directed application in the communication domain. This shows the interconnected role played by cognition and social structure in determining linguistic interaction and gives a better view of how utterances operate in real life communication.

Keywords: Searle's framework, Searle's focus, core theme, Austin's focus, Austin's emphasis, Speech act theory

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نظريّة الأفعال الكلامية والمعنى: مقارنة بين أوستن وسيرل في القصدية واتجاه المعنى

عمر خضير ارجيم

متوسطة الهمامية للبنين

المستخلص

تتناول هذه الدراسة الفروقات بين الطريقة التي يرى بها كل من جون لانجشو أوستن وجون سيرل معنى اللغة في نظرية أفعال الكلام فعلى الرغم من أن كلا الفيلسوفين يعتبران النية فعلاً من أفعال الأداء، إلا أن هناك اختلافاً واضحاً في كيفية ربطهما للأقوال بالسياقات الاجتماعية الأدائية مقارنةً بالنوايا الداخلية المرتبطة بالمعاني الأولية للجمل التي يُنشئها المتكلم. استناداً إلى تحليل نوعي ومقارن لكتاب *كيف نتجر الأشياء بالكلمات لأوستن*، وكتاب *أفعال الكلام لسيرل*، تحدد الورقة نقاط الالقاء والاختلاف الجوهرية بين الكاتبين في مقاربتهما لمعنى الكلمات واستخدامها في ظروف معينة وضمن نية محددة. وتبين الدراسة أن سيرل يمنح مركبة قصوى لمفهوم النية عند تصنيفه لأفعال الكلام، بينما يركز أوستن على السياقات الأدائية والمواقف التي يتم فيها القول. وتدعيم الدراسة طرحها بالقول إن أفعال الكلام لا يمكن منحها معناها من خلال الشكل اللغوي فقط، بل من خلال التطبيق القائم على السياق والهدف داخل مجال التواصل. ويرز ذلك الدور المتشابك لكل من الإدراك والبنية الاجتماعية في تحديد التفاعل اللغوي، ويوفر رؤية أوضح لكيفية عمل الأقوال ضمن التواصل الواقعي.

الكلمات المفتاحية: إطار سيرل، تركيز سيرل، الموضوع الأساسي، تركيز أوستن، تأكيد أوستن، نظرية أفعال الكلام.

Introduction

The conceptualization of language as action developed by J.L. Austin and built upon by John Searle constituted one of the most important trends in the philosophy of the twentieth century. According to these philosophers, speaking does not only mean to say things, declare truths and falsehoods, but it is an activity of acting. However, in spite of the common ground, Austin and Searle are highly different concerning the orientation to the semantics of speech and the presence of Speaker intention.

The difference between constative and performative utterances by Austin highlights the role played by surrounding social context on speech. He shows us that what is uttered greatly depends on the context under which it is uttered. Searle, on the contrary, pays attention to the way the speaker is guided by his/her intention and identifies whether the speech act being conducted is a statement, question or so on (Austin, 1962; Searle, 1969). Such variations indicate two disparate directions in conceiving mechanisms whereby language plays its role in the interaction of humans.

The paper will discuss how each of these two philosophers sees the process of communication between the speaker and listener and between the word and the meaning and how the intention gets inserted into the act of the speaker. According to the speech acts theory, language is not just a way of expressing reality or a description of events, but

a way of social action and power. Communication in this context does not only entail uttering words but also an output including making a promise, a command, or apology.

The theory presented called Speech Act Theory focuses mainly on the input of the listener in identifying the intention of the speaker, and the significance of being informed of the situation that is happening in real-time, as well as the objective of the communication. Everything is getting to be as Haloui (2011, p. according to 51) meaning only emerges through interaction between a speaker and a listener in a given social situation.

From this perspective, it is impossible to grasp the language in terms of semantic content of words. Instead, meaning is constructed by the context of usage of those words. When someone states that you are a liar, the statement will not only make a description, but also an accusation and a judgment. It is not descriptive language rather it is performative.

The first contribution of Austin demotivated the focus on language as a system of signs and brought up language as an action. Searle extended this basis by standardizing the regulations of various kinds of speech acts. The two voices although agree the performative ability of language differentiate on how meaning is established and guided in communication.

Problem Statement

Although the similarities between the origins of Austin and Searle in the development of the Speech Act Theory cannot be denied, the essence of defining the path and orientation of meaning adopted by the two philosophers is still overwhelmed by a cloud of obscurity. The emphasis provided by Austin on social performativity and mental intentionality by Searle tends to generate interpretive overlap involving philosophically separate opinions, which causes confusion to students and scholars.

Objectives of the Study

This research aims to:

1. Compare the philosophical underpinnings of Austin and Searle regarding speech acts.
2. Explore how each theorist conceptualizes the role of intention and direction in language use.
3. Clarify the implications of their views for understanding meaning in communication.

Research Questions

1. How does Austin define and apply the concept of performative utterances in speech acts?
2. What is Searle's understanding of intentionality and how does it shape his theory of speech acts?
3. In what ways do the concepts of direction and intention differ between Austin and Searle?

Significance of the Study

The present paper adds to the philosophical and linguistic discussion by shedding light on the subtlety of the dissimilarities between two of the pioneering authors of the theory on speech act. The way it is introduced like by a novice makes the learners understand the complex concepts through rather simplified, but still correct, interpretations of it, which is how the philosophy of language is subsequently engaged in more detail.

Theoretical Background

This part gives the philosophical background through which the critique of Austin versus Searle is based. It is concerned with the terminology that forms the core of the theory of speech acts, such as performative utterances, illocutionary acts and intentionality. The work by Austin (1962) was that of highlighting how uttering a sentence could be synonymous to doing an action and this was mostly in situations that were like "I apologize or I promise". These are utterances where the performative utterances do not fall under the categories of truth or falsity it does create meaning in a social scenario.

On top of Austin, Searle (1969) put forward a more systematic explanation. He made a difference between the constitutive and regulative rules where he argued that speech acts have internal rules which determine how they are framed. His scheme of identifying the illocution type of speech acts (assertives, directives, commissives, expressives, declarative) provided the foundation for insight regarding the production and recognition of speech acts as the result of rule applications.

Searle incorporates key concepts into his theory, and one of the main concepts is intentionality or directedness of mental states to objects or state of affairs. Searle defined meaning in a way that was not like the previous scholar Austin as he laid greater focus on the mechanism of meaning on an inside reference of the speaker which is within the psyche of the speaker. This generates a theoretical strain: the model that Austin presents is contextualist and socially situated, whereas Searle presents a cognitivist model of rules.

Critiques of Searle due to his fixation on individual intention were also made through such theoretically based arguments like Habermas (1984), where the emphasis of his work was on communicative rationality. More importantly, later theorists criticized the

two models by lack of consideration to the question of power and the place of ideology in the construction of meaning.

Even though the paper refers to a lot of philosophical works, lack of the empirical studies prevents the theory to be used in modern linguistic pragmatics. However, the theoretical observations cannot be underestimated when it comes to outlining a model in which the contrast between the performative-contextual interpretation by Austin may be opposed to the intentionalist-rule-based account by Searle.

This paper uses the two frameworks as the lens through which the depth and direction of the meaning in speech act are analyzed. The analysis part contains a comparative table of their key differences.

Methodology of the Study

This study makes use of a comparative method of conceptual analysis that has philosophical underpinnings. Empirical validation is not sought after but the clarification and differentiation of theoretical concepts. The study is directed by the following methodological steps:

1. **Textual Analysis:** Primary texts by J.L. Austin (1962) and John Searle (1969) are closely read and analyzed to extract their central philosophical claims on meaning, intention, and speech acts.
2. **Thematic Categorization:** Key themes such as “performative utterances,” “illocutionary acts,” “intentionality,” and “constitutive rules” are identified and used to organize the philosophers’ positions into comparative categories.
3. **Comparative Framework:** Using a matrix approach, Austin and Searle’s views are mapped across selected dimensions e.g., context vs. intention, external vs. internal orientation, social function vs. rule-governed logic.
4. **Secondary Literature Review:** The analysis is supported and contextualized with secondary sources (e.g., Habermas, Haloui), enhancing theoretical depth and locating the study within broader philosophical discourse.

This methodology is especially well adapted to philosophy of language theoretical studies, where one would be trying to understand the logical consistency, suppositions and consequences of opposing positions other than empirical hypotheses. It is also quite congruent with the novice-level point of view of the paper, since of a certain level of accessibility and yet clear and thorough exposition of philosophy.

Data Analysis and Findings

The analysis compares Austin and Searle across several thematic dimensions, using textual examples and conceptual contrasts to elucidate their views. Key utterances like “I quit” or “I apologize” are examined through both frameworks to demonstrate how each philosopher interprets the act performed.

1. **Analytical Framework:** A comparative matrix is employed to juxtapose Austin's and Searle's theories. For example:

Theme	Austin	Searle
Orientation	Social/contextual	Mental/intentional
Example: "I quit"	A public declaration (performative)	An act with propositional content and illocutionary force
Rules	Implicit, derived from usage	Explicit, rule-governed (constitutive rules)
Meaning	Defined by situation	Defined by speaker's intent

2. **Thematic Coding:** Textual passages from both primary sources are thematically categorized under concepts such as "illocutionary force," "performative success," "felicity conditions," and "intentional states."
3. **Triangulation:** The study cross-references its findings with secondary sources such as Habermas (1984) and Haloui (2011) to ensure conceptual consistency and philosophical depth.
4. **Engagement with Counterarguments:** Philosophers like H.P. Grice offer critiques of both Austin and Searle, particularly around the reliance on speaker intention. The paper addresses these critiques by situating Austin's model as more socially embedded and Searle's as more cognitively rigorous.

The findings indicate that Austin's model better accounts for socially embedded meaning, while Searle offers a clearer structure for intentional meaning-making. Each has its limitations, but together, they present a multifaceted understanding of how language operates as action in human communication.

1. Austin's Account of Speech Acts: Performativity and Conventional Force

With his work, Austin 1962 *The How to Do Things with Words*, made an announcement that people do not just state the facts through the words, but actually do certain things. Take the example here: I name this ship and I bet you: they both do something and mean at the same time. The definition of language to Austin implied social behaviours of people (Austin, 1962; Urmson & Sbisa, 1975).

The functions which Austin employs are locutionary act (saying something), illocutionary act (doing something in what you say) and perlocutionary act (the consequences on listeners). The concept of meaning in utterances can be examined in three respects, which are in terms of moving act to audience and intention to statement (Hornsby, 1994).

The model as postulated by Austin is that what makes a speech act successful or not is the outer circumstances as opposed to what the speaker actually says (Warnock 1989). is what it plans to convey. Austin started that enterprise, in what may be considered a stab

at drawing a two-way distinction between what he called constative and performative utterances: according to him, to issue a constative utterance was to make a statement (1975: 6, note 2); whereas, in the case of performatives, the uttering of an utterance, is the performing of an action (1975: 6) and again, it is an action, which is not, typically speaking, the action of saying something (1975: 7). The latter performative utterances were in addition found to possess a certain self-fulfilling nature: to utter that one is performing an action of a particular kind can, Austin found, often be enough, in the right kind of circumstances, actually to perform the action in question; i. e., to say That is I do (take him or her to be my lawfully wedded spouse) or With this ring I thee wed in the appropriate context within a marriage ceremony is (it is alleged) to marry the addressee of the utterance (in the second case). It is not merely promising, betting, bequeathing, and all these were originally thought to be performatives.

Performance is a thing that an act is done (Goulder and Hornsby, 2011: section 1). Actions (so understood) are commonly (but not univocally⁸) viewed as events - that is, instances of specific occurrences like the Great Fire of London in 1666 or the election of a President in the US in 2016 (and not repeatable kind of occurrence like a fire or a Presidential election). How are they to be individuated? Many things might hinge, e.g. when I raise my arm in a meeting, expressing a favourable vote on a proposal at hand. What actions have I carried out? The proponents of the fine-grained individuation of actions (Anscombe, 1958; Davidson, 1963) would hold that there is only one action here the raising of the arm is (identical to) the voting; therefore, there exists a single action that can be characterized in two different ways. Some, after Goldman (1970), wish to individuate actions in a finer-grained way, and in this type of case recognize two actions here; and Goldman himself thinks so (1970: 8) on Austin. Transforming individual psychologies into the property of personalities, it did not owe to the particular plethora of personalities who belong to the given explanation that its meaning has been a sophisticated one; and it is in that spirit, and without wishing to imply that it yields a unique possible interpretation of Austin, that I will investigate this captious approach, in the hope that it may have some emblematic significance with respect to the theory of speech acts.

In the Austinian mature theory of speech acts it suffices to say that to say something is to do something. Specifically, when we utter any words whatever we do the phonetic act of uttering certain noises (1975: 92), the phatic act of uttering certain--of uttering certain (also) words (1975: 92), the rhetic act of uttering the resultant expression with a certain more or less definite sense (and a more or less definite reference) (1975: 92). Such acts can be performed together, which (added to) say something, in the fully normal sense; i.e., that of performing a locutionary act (1975: 94).

2. Searle's Reworking: Intention and Direction of Fit

John Searle responded to Austin in his book, the *Speech Acts* of 1969, and proposed that speech acts become meaningful only through intentions of the person by acknowledging a set of rules. In making any statement, Searle explains that a speaker can

do anything out of trying to ensure that what is spoken has a match with facts (asserting) or that they can order the hearer to do a particular thing (command), (Searle, 1979).

But Searle (1968) presents the much more harshly critical argument that the concept of locutionary act needs to be abandoned as unhelpful (1968: 405) - and that of a rhetic act as well. with it. There are two reasons that he gives in support of this action.

First, he states (1968: 406) that the difference between the locutionary and the illocutionary act is proposed (by Austin) as a distinction between uttering a sentence with a definite sense (or reference) as opposed to uttering a sentence with a definite force (e.g. as a conjecture or assertion): but some sentences (the explicit performatives, such as those beginning I promise...) are such that the forces they are uttered with depend upon the meanings they are uttered with; and so, on these sentences, the fact that the Second, he observes that Austin describes the locutionary act by direct, and on other occasions by indirect, quotation: but that when the former is used, this indeed states the phatic act (1968: 411); whereas with the latter, the reports speak illocutionary verbs (though highly general), and so state a genus of illocutionary act (with various species).

This second holds good of all sentences (not only of the performatives): In view of this Searle concludes, no sentence is absolutely force-neutral (1968: 412); and he proceeds (1968: 420) These arguments are not compelling. With the first instance, Searle overlooks that even a performative verb in the explicit form may be employed in its non-performative sense, and without illocutionary force whatsoever: consider an actor on the stage saying, I promise you that..., and making no promise at all; and more than this, we can, as Austin himself points out, embed such a sentence e.g. in the antecedent of a conditional without producing a change in meaning (cf. Geach, 1965) - though in uttering the sentence in this linguistic context we do not make a promise.¹⁶ This is the mistake Austin himself makes when he says, 'To perform a locutionary act is in general... also and *eo ipso* to perform an illocutionary act' (1975: 98): there are cases in which we perform one without performing arguments that rhetic acts are reported by say in ordinary language (both the direct and indirect discourse).

As an example, she claims that such entities as she terms as word-NPs, such expressions as the words, I love you, or a few words, represent structured pluralities of meaningful expression and may themselves be a complement of say (and other such verbs) in the relevant sense. And, assuming that, what he or she says when he or she does perform a rhetic act is already a structured plurality (of words,--with that or that particular set of meanings,--and according to, and as according to, a grammar), much as Austin supposed. But then the actions thereby reported are not, as Moltmann does believe, the propositional acts of Searle, because the meanings of the different words assembled in the structured plurality do not (yet) become composited: what is said is not, on her account, a unity, one like a proposition; it remains a (kind of) plurality.

3. Key Differences in Direction and Intention

In order to realize the difference between Austin and Searle, it is requisite to observe at two interconnected distinctions.

Both Austin and Searle assimilate meaning into the social facts that accompany speech hence making such a move as Austin does to direct attention to that, according to Austin, on the outside, the real outcome of what is spoken. However, to Searle, consciousness of a statement entails a speaker going out of his way to adopt a method of expression to relate or define reality (Searle, 1983). It is not enough to have an intention but even then Austin argued that the success of an act lies in the conventions and the appropriateness of the speech in that context (Austin, 1962). In line with this, Searle affirms that the correct aim is the chief determinant factor of a successful speech act; any incorrectness in intention leads to a failure (Searle, 1969; Recanati, 1987).

This contrast, as Tsohatzidis (1994) reveals, touches on more general philosophical commitments: Austin is more inferenced into pragmatism, where meaning is found in practices; Austin is more referred to as analytic, where meaning is viewed as rule-constituted intentionality.

4. Implications for Meaning and Communication

Aspects like these have an impact on the building of explanations regarding communication. Austin demonstrates that the language is revealed through analysis of the things done, places and roles. Although Searle demonstrates how the brain process generates speech, he does not elaborate much on the role played by social interaction in formation of various types of speech (Habermas, 1984). In their view, Searle avoids the entire complexity of intention (Mey, 2001; Vanderveken, 1990). Arguments. The first obstacle that a person comes across with distinctions of Austin is the fact that it appears to be incapable of general treatment, of making mutually exclusive the two categories of acts, since in a number of sentences meaning (in the Austin sense) can be said to determine (at least) one illocutionary force of the use of a sentence. So any number of illocutionary acts can be sincerely performed with the literal meaning of the sentence I am going to do it, what about then the sentence I hereby promise that I am going to do it? Its solemn and literal speaking, must be a promise.

Nonetheless, such an argument has a number of issues. To begin with, Searle too introduces too much by talking about seriousness. Nor may all uses of language, all uses of language which lead to locutionary acts, be serious uses in the relevant sense. We can terminate an excessive phone call by saying I swear I will never call you again! and do its corresponding locutionary act that says that s/he promises to call never again meanwhile being ironical. When one is doing that he is obviously not even making any promises. Second, this argument also fails to pay attention to the mooted difference between the successful performance of an act having illocutionary force and having performed the act with that illocutionary force. Even when it were allowed that a serious use of I promise that I am going to do it would involve an attempt at promising, it would not follow that one had undertaken the illocutionary act of promising as that requires uptake by the audience (Ferguson 1973, 172174).

Searle second, major objection is more to the point and needs elaboration. Remarking that Austin employs forms of indirect speech to report locutionary acts, Searle says: But now observe why there is an essential pitfall with the indirect forms: the verb phrases in a report of rhetic acts always make use of illocutionary verbs. They are very general illocutionary verbs no doubt, but they are illocutionary just the same. Naturally, it is like this example: He told me to X. Could not the form He told me to cover an awfully wide range of illocutionary forces, and have its scope include such identifiably different illocutionary forces as, e.g., He ordered or commanded me, He requested, urged, advised me? The verbs of Austin in the examples of indirect speech reports of rhetic acts are all verbs of a very general type (verbs of illocution), which to the verbs he uses to report illocutionary acts are genus to species. Now there seems to be nothing to argue about here (Searle 1968, 411; compare Alston 1994, 32; Hare 1971, 107108). Searle simply concludes that in contrast to the views of Austin, say, ask, and tell-to will always report illocutionary acts. What makes him think this? My hypothesis is the following. We should begin with the fact that in his differentiating between the locutionary and illocutionary acts, Austin opposed meaning and the illocutionary force I clarified the performance of an act in this new and second sense as performance of an illocutionary act, i.e.

performance of an act in saying something as opposed to performance of an act of saying something; and I shall use the term the doctrine of the different types of the functions of language here in question the doctrine of the illocutionary forces. ... We may, of course, apply meaning, similarly, to illocutionary force -He meant it as an order, etc. Yet "I do not wish to distinguish force and meaning in that sense in which sense and reference are synonymous" ... It is widely interpreted as a statement that, according to Austin, on the one side there is meaning, on the other side- illocutionary force . Here is the remark of Strawson on the text: Austin makes a distinction between the meaning of an utterance and the force. By the former he identifies what is called the locutionary performance in uttering the utterance, by the latter the illocutionary performance in uttering it. Accordingly what Austin probably meant when he said that force is illocutionary, is that force is by definition illocutionary. Replacement distinction provided by Searle and his view that illocutionary acts encompass every act that is reported in indirect speech have numerous undesirable implications.

The distinction made by Austin observes a rigid boundary between semantics and pragmatics: locutionary acts are simply linguistic and are on the semantics side and what is said; illocutionary acts are social-communicative and are on the pragmatics side and what is meant.¹³ There are possibilities of confusion over Searle view. He employs the identical term illocutionary concerning the voluntary illocutionary action that is purported to be linguistic and resides on side of semantics and determinate kind that is purported to be social-communicative and lies on side of pragmatics. As soon as we missed the difference between determinable and determinate illocutionary acts we are in a mess. Second, it makes it one of terminology that any force in the sense opposite to neutral expression of content is illocutionary. And all this conceals the sense peculiar to Austin of an illocutionary act as an act of social-communicative intention requiring uptake or non-linguistic standard (procedure).

This is what we can observe in the work of Alston. Alston is mostly concerned with the meaning of sentences and he would like to see it linked with what he term as illocutionary acts, acts that are reported in it in indirect speech (Alston 1991, 5758, 2000, 1415). But he knows what the standard reasons are to keep semantics and pragmatics separate and that is why he is denying the role of uptake to be done by illocutionary acts (Alston 2000, 24, 67). In the current perspective what has occurred is that Alston is actually working with the Austinian idea of a locutionary act but, choosing to act upon the principles of Searle, has begun to refer to what Austin himself called an illocutionary act, and has forgotten the original Austinian idea of an illocutionary act. The next point I shall make against Searle is that his all-important additional assumption is untenable and hence that his objection falls wide of the mark.

The conception of representational force as non-neutrality and the Austinian conception of the illocutionary force as a social-communicative meaning of the speech act are independent of each other and Austin has no reason of the theory to believe that the former follows the latter. But, prior to arriving at it we must clarify the concept of force.

Depth of Meaning: Contextual vs. Rule-Based Approach

The essence of Austin and Searle distinction consists in the status of their insights on the depth of meaning. Austin perceives meaning as intragrained within a social and contextual environment. According to his work a variety of contextual felicity conditions does determine the successful performance of a speech act. Searle, on the other hand, formalizes the depth of meaning through constitutive rules:

- **Regulative rules:** govern behaviors that exist independently (e.g., rules of etiquette).
- **Constitutive rules:** create new forms of behavior (e.g., rules of chess, or of declaring someone married).

For Searle, language is rule-governed, and meaning can be analyzed through these structures.

Intentionality and Mental States

A second important difference with their approach towards intentionality, or the concept that states are mind directed to something. Searle incorporates intentionality in speech acts and his general argument has been that the intention of the speaker plays an important role in meaning.

Austin on the other hand talks about intention but such user of elements of the language works in social life, not in the internal world of mind. The former turns the theory of Austin more down-to-earth and behavioral, whereas Searle is cognitive.

Misfires and Misunderstandings

Austin gives a lot of thoughts to misleading instances of speech acts, in which performatives fail, as it were. To give an example, as such, when one says I name this ship, when he has not the right to say it, there occurs the failure of an action.

Searle does admit to this but considers it an infringement of a rule and not a failure related to a situation. He argues that there is felicity conditions i.e conditions that have to be fulfilled by a speech act to be deemed successful.

Everyday Examples

In order to have a more accurate view of the distinction:

Austin: A statement like I quit is not considered as an actual resignation when being used in an informal chat in a party unless it is uttered in the right context (e.g. working environment) to the right person (e.g. boss).

Searle: He would look whether the speaker passed the felicity conditions: authority, intention, suitable situation, etc.

Criticisms and Contributions

Austin is credited for opening the door to understanding language as action, yet his theory lacked systematic rigor. Searle improved on this by creating formal frameworks, though critics argue he sometimes downplays the complexity of social contexts that Austin emphasized.

Conclusion

This paper has also described where the sense is deep in the Speech Act Theory and how J.L. Austin as compared to John Searle fits into this sense. It has responded to the pivotal research questions by showing:

- That Austin describes the performative utterances as actions based on specific context and the social conventions and thereby, renders them meaning conditional to the society based social conventions and the felicity condition of the utterance.
- That the focus of Searle is on the psychological states of the speaker that gives him/her the idea of interpreting speech act as rule-guided activity that gets its significance in accordance with the intention of the speaker.
- These are essentially different directions and purposes in their two theories respectively: Austin is an outward direction of social interaction to meaning whereas Searle is an inward direction of mental intent to meaning.

It is therefore the conclusion of the paper that the two philosophers present complementary opinions on the process of constructing meaning in language. What Austin brings to the table is a sensitive understanding of social performance, whereas

Searle takes us through an elaborate explanation of the intentional structure. This along with some others gets a strong base in the modern theories of pragmatics, discourse, and communication. It could be based in some future work investigating their relevance to digital communication, or to artificial intelligence language interfaces, or to cross-cultural pragmatics, in some way thereby bringing their legacy to bear on modern issues in language philosophy.

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